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.BOOK OF... 



LEGAL 

DICTATION 



Compiled from Actual Work, for the use of 
Teachers and Students of Shorthand 



BY CHARLES CURRIER BEALE 

Official Stenographer of Massachusetts Superior Court 



SECOND EDITION REVISED AND ENLARGED 



Copyright, 1891 and 1901, 
By CHARLES CURRIER BEALE 



Boston, Mass. 

THE BEALE PRESS 

1 901 



T w,r : - ?«-RA«Y OF 
0< WGftESS, 

Twc CurtEfl rtECEive^ 

18 1902 

0©PVRIOHT ENTRY 

CLASS Jet KXc No. 

^ r / o 

COPY J. 



To ENOCH N. MINER, Esq., 



To whose patience, persistency, and perseverance the shorthand 

profession of America owes more than it can ever repay, 

and whose constant loyalty to the phonographic 

fraternity "through thick and thin" has brought 

him, not as much wealth as he deserves, 

but the cordial appreciation and friendship 

of stenographers everywhere, this 

book is dedicated, with the hearty 

good wishes of the author. 



+£# 



a 



rS 



CONTENTS. 



introduction 4 

Legal Correspondence 5' 

Legal Forms and Pleadings .... 37 

Legal Testimony 74 



INTRODUCTION. 



In putting before the public the second edition of this 
work, it seems to the compiler and the publishers, that the 
fact that a second edition is required shows that there is a need 
and a demand for such a work. To those who have not hith- 
erto used the book it will speak for itself, and it is believed 
that those who have used it in the past will find it in its pres- 
ent form greatly improved, especially by the addition of a 
larger number of actual court papers (commonly termed ' 'plead- 
ings") which in most law offices are dictated to and typewrit- 
ten by the stenographer. To make these more helpful they 
have been arranged in the same style as they would be type- 
written, and examples of the ' 'backings" given in many cases. 
The compiler wishes to express his thanks to the several law 
stenographers and attorneys who have kindly assisted him by 
contributing various papers for publication in this book, and 
especially to Samuel W. Mendum, Esq., of the Boston Bar. 
With the hope that the book will be still more useful in the 
future than its kind friends have claimed it to be in the past, it 
is offered again to the shorthand teaching and typewriting 
public. 

The Compiler. 



LEGAL CORRESPONDENCE. 



NOTE — The following collection of lawyers' letters embraces 
a great variety of legal topics, and contains a considerable vocab- 
ulary of words used in lawyers' dictation. The abbreviation v. is 
pronounced usually against, although it may be rendered by versus, 
or simply pronounced as the letter v. The expression and is 
often used in place of v. or vs.; thus, "The case of Black and 
White," meaning, "The case of Black vs. White.'* In stating 
the number of words in each letter, the address and closing ex- 
pressions are included, but not the dateline. Numerals are estimated 
as being the least number of spoken words required to express 
them; as i899=eighteen ninety-nine (three words); $25.18= 
twenty-five dollars eighteen cents (five words.) The date in the 
first half of the letters is given as Boston in each case; but in the 
second half a variety of localities is given. 



Boston, Mass., Dec. 7, 1899. 

Mr. William White, 

35 Summer St., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Confirming what I told you in the Court House 
yesterday, I say in writing that if the Nantucket Bank presents 
its claim to the receivers of J. Scott & Son, I shall, early in 
March, move that the claim be paid in full without interest. This 
of course is in reliance upon the statement that the bank bought 
the note before maturity from the broker without notice of the 
circumstances under which the name of J. Scott & Son was affixed 
to it. I wish all unquestioned debts of J. Scott & Son, paid at 
earliest possible moment. 

Very truly yours, (112 words) 



LEGAL DICTATION 



Boston, Mass., Nov. 13, 1899. 
Mr. Henry F. Leonard, 

Lawrence, Mass. 
Dear sir* — 

You sent me ten dollars for disbursements made 
by Kelley. This turned out to be one dollar less than he had 
actually paid. Will you kindly send me a dollar, and close the 
account? 

Very truly yours, (45 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 7, 1899. 
Mr. Henry Barber, 

23 Court St., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

• Mr. Bell has just handed me the enclosed inter- 
locutory decree in Grimes v. Richards. We notice that you have 
inserted the words < 'Receivers for this purpose to." We should 
very much prefer not to have those words inserted, unless you 
think the plaintiff will suffer if they are omitted. Neither Mr. 
Wiley nor Mr. Greenleaf suggested these words when the decree 
was under consideration, and for certain reasons we dislike the 
idea of having the receivers appointed. Trusting you will think 
it proper to strike out these words, I am, 

Very truly yours, (104 words) 

Boston, Mass., Nov. 23, 1899. 
Mr. Henry F. Knight, 
So. Berwick, Me. 
Dear sir: — 

Mr. James, who as you remember, is Mr. 
Turner's lawyer, writes me that Mrs. Turner has some things in 
storage in this city, but she is too poor to pay the storage charges 
and the cartage. She will, however, return them, if you will pay the 
charges and cartage, and will upon their return, send the jewelry to 
her, at the end of six months, if she did not in the meantime, 
annoy you at Portland. Above all things, I wish to keep every 
engagement that I make, and do not wish any lawyer or other man 
either, to be able to say that I ever failed to do what I have 
promised. I shall consider it a personal favor, if you will let this 
jewelry go. It is, 1 think, of no value. 

Very truly yours, (146 words) 



LEGAL DICTATION 



Boston, Mass., Nov. n, 1899. 
Mr. Charles Armstrong, 
Springfield, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I received your letter of March 18, saying that 
you had executed the release and forwarded it to Mrs. Kidder, 
have not received it from her. 

Yours truly, (3 5 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 6, 1899. 
Mr. William Anthony, 

45 High St., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I send you waiver of Alexander Porter and 
Brother, to deposit in case Arthur v. Clarke, and an order to you 
to collect. Please acknowledge receipt and oblige, 

Very truly yours, (42 words) 



Boston, Mass., Nov. 15, 1899. 
Mr. Howard Chase, 
Beverly, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Enclosed please find the following papers: Re- 
port and objections; request for finding; a bill; the notes, checks, 
account, and other exhibits introduced before me at the hearing on 
the last reference. 

Yours truly, (40 words) 

Boston, Mass., Nov. 29, 1899. 
Mr. Oliver Crane, 

Fall River, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Is not the claim of F. E. Bennett & Co., brought 
against the insolvent estate of Osgood & Pray? If so, what more 
is there to be done? There is no necessity in that case of waiving 
the deposit of the defendant. It is the duty of the registrar 
to pay. 

Very truly yours, (62 words) 



8 LEGAL DICTATION 



Boston, Mass., Nov. 27, 1899. 
Mr. William R. Rogers, 

15 Winter St., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I have today collected twenty-five dollars from 
Mrs. Adams, and have delivered the lease which I have received 
two or three days ago from Mis. Jones. I have sent a check, as 
you requested, to the First National Bank, of Portland, Oregon, to 
the credit of the estate of James R. Jones. I have not delivered 
the promissory note, but have brought a suit, and an attachment, 
which 1 hope will enable me to collect more from Adams. 

Very truly yours, (93 words) 

Boston, Mass., Nov. 29, 1899. 
Mr. William French, 

94 Washington St., Boston, Mass, 
Dear sir: — 

Enclosed you will please find account as ad- 
ministrator of the estate of your father. You will notice that 1 
have treated all personal property not disposed of, as cash, and 
have made a distribution upon that basis. If there are no mistakes 
in this account, will you have your brothers and sisters assent to 
the account on the first page, and return it to me, and I will 
have it allowed. As soon as the account is allowed, you had 
best, as I suggested this morning, make a written deposition that 
you hold shipping and other property not disposed of, in trust for 
your brothers and sisters. 

Yours truly, » (121 words) 

Boston, Mass., Nov. 29, 1899. 
Mr. Horace Hill, 

19 South St., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I have received a check from Abijah Jackson, 
attorney, to whom your claim against Gunn was sent. He settled 
for sixty-two dollars, and made a charge of three dollars. I charge 
one dollar for my services, and send a check for fifty-eight 
dollars. 

Very truly yours, (59 words) 



LEGAL DICTATION 



Boston, Mass., Dec. 4, 1899. 
Mr. Henry Smith, 

87 Tremont St., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Sign the enclosed petition, then step to the tele- 
phone and acknowledge it before me, and mail it back at your 
earliest convenience. 

Very truly yours, (36 words) 

Boston, Mass., Nov. 27, 1899. 
Mr. Henry T. Miller, 

48 Bromfield St., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Enclosed you will please find my check for 
twenty-one hundred dollars, which you will please place to the 
credit of the estate of James A. Jones. This is the proceeds of the 
collection upon the amount due the estate; and 1 forward the 
amount due the estate, and I forward the money to you by the 
directions of Mr. A. R. Burt, one of the executors. Please ac- 
knowledge receipt and return. 

Yours truly, (86 words) * 

Boston, Mass., Nov. 29, 1899. 
Mr. Frank Hall, 

28 School St., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I have just had a conversation with Mr. Atkinson 
about the affairs of H. A. Hallett. Mr. Atkinson informs me that 
he expects Mr. Baker will be able to effect a settlement with the 
creditors of the Hallett estate, that if he does so he will release 
you from all outside claims, and by outside claims, he means all 
claims excepting your personal notes which you gave Charles 
Hallett at the time of the dissolution of the firm. Mr. Atkinson 
also assures me that Mr. Baker will make no disposition of the 
notes without giving you or me reasonable notice of intention so 
to do, so that you can take action to prevent them from passing 
into the hands of innocent third parties. For certain reasons, Mr. 
Baker does not care to sign an agreement in writing, but Mr. 



IO LEGAL DICTATION 



Atkinson makes this statement after talking with Mr. Baker, and 
I have dictated this letter in Mr. Atkinson's presence, so that we 
may be sure that our minds completely meet in this matter. You 
can, I think, rest entirely easy now in this matter. I certainly 
advise you to do nothing at present. 

Very truly yours, (206 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 4, 1899. 
Mr. Frank L. Rogers, 
Somerville, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I have heard nothing from Mrs. George. Some- 
thing should be done before a great while, and I would like to 
know who is to be appointed administrator of your father's estate, 
as 1 am trying to arrange a settlement of the Collins suit. 

Very truly yours, (54 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 4, 1899. 
Mr. Robert Downing, 

76 Summer St., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

You returned my bill of July 1, and asked me 
what was the first item. It was for the consultation about those 
two contracts. I first made a rough draft, which was subsequently 
changed. There were more than two interviews about this con- 
tract. I made a charge of twelve dollars for the whole. Duplicate 
bill enclosed. You also asked about the first item of my bill to 
the firm. That was for consultation about the insurance on Salem 
property. 

Very truly yours, (93 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 4, 1899. 
Dr. William Grant, 

95 Court St., Boston, Mass. 
Mear sir: — 

The insurance policies have been transferred to 
Mr. Douglass. He should pay you $135.83. He called here 
Wednesday, and said he could not pay cash, and wished to see 
you about it. 

Very truly yours, (53 words) 



LEGAL DICTATION 



Boston, Mass., Dec. 4, 1899. 
Mr. Frank L. Kimball, 

23 Court St., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I have your note of yesterday, saying you are 
satisfied that the Mechanics' National Bank holds the notes des- 
cribed in the letter sent to you, and that it has presented its claim 
to the receivers under order of the court. I have asked Mr. Curtis 
to present the notes to you, so that you may see that they are nil 
perfectly straight. My only desire is that there may be no mis- 
understanding. I have not yet been able to ascertain just what 
claim you think had been presented to the receivers. 

Yours truly, (105 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 5, 1899. 
Mr. Henry Folger, 

267 Columbus Ave., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Mr. Lowell has brought me the insurance policies, 
four in number; all made payable to your order. You should pay 
for one, $43.50; for another, the same amount; the third, $7/50: 
and for the fourth, $32.00; which is the value of the policies 
for the unexpired term. The first three policies expire on the 
22d of April, 1903, and the last, Dec. 4, 1901. 

Very truly yours, (94 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 4, 1899. 
Mr. Henry Fuller, 

18 St. Botolph St., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Mr. Brown will give two notes, one for three 
months, the other for six months, each for one hundred and fifty 
dollars, with interest at six per cent., endorsed by both of his 
sons-in-law, in settlement of the account. Jordan, one of the 
sons-in-law, called today, and he says he has real property in his 
own name, which cost six thousand dollars, assessed for four 
thousand, and that he has some other property. If 1 examine a 
record of Jordan's real property, it may incur quite an expense. 



LEGAL DICTATION 



I think Jordan tells the truth. If, however, Mrs. Brown left un- 
encumbered real estate, or an estate the equity of which was of 
much value, 1 should prefer not to take the notes. 

Very truly yours, (139 words)- 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 4, 1899. 
Mr. Hiram Hall, 

Waverly, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I have your letter of yesterday, and notice what 
you say about Mrs. George's taking out letters of administration 
on the estate of her husband. That is all right. I should be glad 
to know who represents her, so that I can consult him about a 
settlement of the suit of Marsh and Gilchrist. 

Yours truly, (63 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 5, 1899. 
Mr. William G. Lawrence, 

67 Milk St., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I thank you for the information contained in your 
letter of the 20th. Mr. Irish owes a friend for borrowed money, 
which he promised to repay at a fixed time, but has failed to keep 
his promise. There is no desire to oppress him, but he refuses to 
pay any attention to letters, or I should not have written to you. 
Very truly yours, (76 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 6, 1899. 
Mr. G. H. Jackson, 

Braintree, Vermont. 
Dear sir: — 

1 have notified Mr. James that if the Boston 
Security and Trust Co. presents its claim to the receivers of Jones, 
Scott & Sons, I shall, early in September, move the Court that 
the receivers be ordered to pay the face of the claim without 
interest or costs. I see no defence to this note, and think it best 
to have it paid. 

Yours truly, (73 words) 



LEGAL DICTATION I 3 



Boston, Mass., Dec. 4, 1899. 
Messrs. Haines & Gorman, 

Salem, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Mr. Foster did not have your claim against 
Brown & Jones proved because he hoped to prevent the composition 
from going through. Attorney for the debtor will pay the money, 
however, without proof. I enclose two letters which I have re- 
ceived from Mr. Foster, and ask you to return them after reading. 
Very truly yours, (63 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 6, 1899. 
Mr. E. L. Kendall, 

Brockton, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

1 can not say what rule the Court will adopt 
about allowing interest on these promissory notes. I think the 
proper way for you is to present your note to the receiver, and 
with it a statement to which will be attached a copy of the note, 
so that the Court may have all the facts before it. 

Yours truly, (68 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 4, 1899. 
Mr. Frank Rollins, 

Melrose, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Mr. Henry Snow, as administrator of the estate 
of P. N. Gray, will make no distribution without a petition to the 
court, and an order, and in his petition he will state the kinship of 
the client, Mrs. Flaherty. 

Very truly yours, (49 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 6, 1899. 
Mrs. B. H. Clark, 

Stoughton, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Enclosed you will please find a promissory 
note for $175.00, dated June 1, 1898, made by Henry Brimble- 
come, payable four months after date at my bank in Boston. This 



14 LEGAL DICTATION 



is to pay the insurance policies for $37.00 each. You will remem- 
ber that the indemnity policy was valued at $28.00. Mr. Brimble- 
come says that Mr. Boynton has taken that back to compute 
against its value, and that he will pay you cash for it. 

Yours truly, (93 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 6, 1899. 
Mr. Harold Lincoln, 
Lowell, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I trust you will give Mr. Scott all the time you 
can to pay the balance due on his 1 896 taxes. He has been some- 
what unfortunate in business for the last two or three years, and 
is temporarily embarrassed. He has, however, as 1 know, unen- 
cumbered real estate in Brockton, which he is trying to sell, and 
which I am sure he will succeed in a short time in selling or 
borrowing money upon. You may rest assured that Mr. Scott 
will pay his taxes as soon as he can. I should fully appreciate 
any consideration you may show him. 

Very truly yours, (112 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 7, 1899. 
Mr. Peter Sterling, 

53 Warren Ave., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I wrote McDonald several times, and also wrote 
to the firm, but neither paid any attention until 1 brought suit, and 
summoned the firm as trustee. This evidently called the matter 
sufficiently to Mr. McDonald's attention, for he wrote to you. 
There are expenses incurred which he must pay. I return Mc- 
Donald's letter. 

Very truly yours, (67 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 7, 1899. 
Mr. William F. Fuller, 

23 Court St., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sin- 
Enclosed is a schedule of the vessel property 
owned by the two firms of S. Scott & Son. I understand you 



LEGAL DICTATION I 5 



think it has not been fairly inventoried, and as Messrs. Marston & 
Co. wish you to be fully satisfied as to that matter, I send the list. 
I simply request that your client, Mr. Jackson, will not advertise 
unnecessarily the fact of just what property Mr. Marston has. 

Very truly yours, (84 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 7, 1899. 
Mr, Henry Dobson, 

579 Washington St., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Mr. Alger forwarded me your letter to him of 
the 25 th of December, and authorized me to settle upon the basis 
you propose. 1 cannot do it, because 1 have already brought suit, 
and expenses have been incurred. If you had taken the trouble to 
answer my letter, all would have been right. 

Very truly yours, (70 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 12, 1899. 
Mr. James Hogg, 

Somerville, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I will hear you in Mulligan and Doherty, 
the 27th, at ten o'clock. I go away on Tuesday for a month, and 
would like to arrange for hearings for Black and White in October. 
Please inform me by telephone, if you cannot take Mulligan and 
Doherty, as I have much to do, and would like to arrange for 
these matters if you cannot. 

Yours truly, (73 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 12, 1899. 
Mr. George Oatman, 
Brockton, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Somebody from the City Hall of Lynn called 
upon me the other day. He presented me what he said was a 
copy of the plan of the Sargent land, which you had procured for 
me. If so, some mistake was made. The enclosed is a tracing 



1 6 LEGAL DICTATION 



from Mr. Greenleaf's plan. I trust you have not been put to any 
inconvenience by the mistake, if any was made in this office. 

Yours truly, (79 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 7, 1899. 
Mr. William F. Kimball, 

79 Blackstone St., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

1 have your letter of yesterday, in which you 
say that you think my charges are too high, and that you are 
surprised to receive your bill before the estate of your uncle is 
settled. The charges are exceedingly low. You must remember 
the expense of running an office in a large city is much greater 
than in a country town. I sent you the bill on the first day of 
July, because I make out my bills every six months. If you wish 
it to stand until the estate is settled, or until a more convenient 
time for payment, it may. I wish to do everything to accom- 
modate you. 

Very truly yours, (125 words) 



Boston, Mass., Dec. 11, 1899. 
Messrs. Hill & Snow, 

Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Mr. Peterson telephones me that you are mak- 
ing written contracts for the purchase and sale of canned and other 
goods, many of which are made with brokers, and wishes me to 
advise you in writing whether the memoranda for the purchase 
and sale must be stamped. The War-Revenue Law, in Schedule A, 
on pages 12 and 14, contains the following clauses: — "Upon such 
sale, agreement of sale, or agreement to sell, any products or 
merchandise at any exchange, or board of trade, or other similar 
place, either for present or future delivery, for each one hundred 
dollars in value of said sale or agreement of sale, or agreement to 
sell, one cent; and for each additional one hundred dollars, or 
fractional part thereof, in excess of one hundred dollars, one cent; 
provided that on every sale, or agreement of sale, or agreement to 
sell, as aforesaid, there shall be made and delivered by the seller 



LEGAL DICTATION 1 7 



to the buyer, a bill, memorandum of agreement, or other evidence 
of such sale, or agreement to sell, to which there shall be affixed a 
lawful stamp or stamps, in value equal to the amount of the tax 
on such sale. And every such bill, memorandum, or other evi- 
dence of sale, or agreement to sell, shall show the date thereof, 
the name of the seller, the amount of the sale, and the matter or 
thing to which it refers. And any person or persons, liable to 
pay the tax, as herein provided, or any one who acts in the matter 
as agent or broker for such person or persons, who shall make any 
such sale, or agreement of sale, or agreement to sell, who shall, 
in pursuance of any such sale, or agreement of sale, or agreement 
to sell, deliver any such products or merchandise without a bill, 
memorandum, or other evidence thereof, as herein required, or 
who shall deliver such bill, memorandum, or other evidence of 
sale, or agreement to sell, without having the proper stamps affixed 
thereto, with intent to evade the foregoing provisions, shall be 
found guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall 
pay a fine of not less than five hundred dollars, nor more than one 
thousand dollars, or be imprisoned not more than six months, or 
both, at the discretion of the court." 

Contract: Broker's note, or memorandum of sale of any 
goods or merchandise, stocks, bonds, exchange, notes of hand, real • 
estate, or property of any kind or description, issued by brokers 
or persons acting as such, for each note or memorandum of sale, 
not otherwise provided for in this Act, ten cents. 

I am quite inclined to think that Congress intended to tax 
only those contracts made by and between brokers, or with 
brokers, or in some exchange or similar place. You will notice in 
the first line of the first clause, which 1 have quoted above, the 
words "at any exchange or board of trade, or other similar place," 
and in the second clause, the words "by brokers or persons acting 
as such." 

Clause 4, Section 2. "Commercial brokers shall pay twenty 
dollars. Every person, firm or company whose business it is as a 
broker to negotiate sales or purchases of goods, wares, produce, 
merchandise, or to negotiate freights and other business for owners 
of vessels, or for the shippers or consignors or consignees of freight 
carried by vessels, shall be regarded as a commercial broker under 
this Act." 



LEGAL DICTATION 



If you were to make contracts with other merchants, and al- 
ways in your own store, or in some place which could not be 
construed as an exchange, board of trade, or other similar place, I 
should have little hesitation in advising you that under these 
clauses, you are under no obligation to affix the stamps required. 
This question has not been passed upon by any court; indeed, 
there has not been time to present it to a court. It has been 
somewhat discussed, and there is a disagreement among those who 
have considered it, as to what Congress did intend in these 
clauses. It is, I think, better to be on the safe side, and to affix 
the stamp called for by the act, rather than to take any chance 
of a violation of the statute. If the statute does apply to all agree- 
ments to sell, each memorandum must be stamped. You will 
notice that for each one hundred dollars in value of the agreement 
for sale, there must be a stamp of one cent, and for each addi- 
tional one hundred dollars, or fractional part thereof, one cent in 
addition. 

Regretting that 1 cannot speak with more authority on this 



subject, I am, 



Very truly yours, (790 words) 

Boston, Mass., Nov. 11, 189c 



Mr. George Eames, 

Abington, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

What did Mr. McKinley say about the agree- 
ment I sent? Kindly inform me, and oblige, 

Yours truly, (25 words) 

Boston, Mass., Nov. 23, 1899. 
Mr. Leonard F. Lowell, 

Allston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I have yours of yesterday, informing me that you 
will move in Jennings v. Soule, on Tuesday morning, to establish 
the claim of the Mechanics' National Bank against T. Archer & 
Co., and to have the question of fact tried and determined by a 
jury. I wish you would have the bank write to John Gorman, 
one of the receivers, sending him a copy of the note which it holds, 



LEGAL DICTATION 1 9 



and stating that the bank wishes the claim presented for allowance 
against the firm. I think it useless for you to present your motion 
to go to the jury, because Judge Dunbar refused a similar motion 
last week. However, I will go up, unless you notify me in the 
meantime, that you do not care to press it. 

Very truly yours, (139 words) 

Boston, Mass., Dec. 12, 1899. 
Mr. Arthur Wells, 

Abington, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I find that you have demanded some items 
which will necessitate a revision of my report as auditor, which 
results in increasing somewhat the amount of Jones' discounts. I 
send you a copy of the revised draft. I shall immediately file 
my report, and would like you to send for your papers. I think 
Mr. Jones took your letter of December, 1894. 

Yours truly, (74 words) 

Boston, Mass., Nov. n, 1899.- 
Mr. Albert Turner, 
Quincy, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Enclosed you will please find absolute decree 
for divorce against your wife, Alice A. Turner. You are now 
entirely free from her. 

Yours truly, (31 words) 



Boston, Mass., Nov. 11, 1899. 
Mr. David Jacobs, 

Everett, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I have your note of yesterday, and notice your 
consideration for the widow. I think I will wait until we get the 
report of the auditor before 1 say more. 

Yours truly, (39 words) 



20 LEGAL DICTATION 



Boston, Mass., Nov. 23, 1899. 
Mr. Frederick Davis. 

224 Huntington Ave., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I have your letter of yesterday. I shall not of 
course, take any action you do not wish, if you are sure that my 
bill will be paid. Your brother has done nothing but criticise me, and 
find fault, and I do not think that I have been treated quite fairly 
in this matter. I therefore propose to be paid soon. 

Very truly yours, (jj words) 

Boston, Mass., Nov. n, 1899. 
Mr. Harvey Morton, 

Natick, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Will you kindly inform me when Mrs. Cart- 
wright will pay bill for services rendered in her petition against the 
Commonwealth? 

Yours truly, (29 words) 

Boston, Mass., Nov. 11, 1899. 
Mr. Amos Morgan, 

Brockton, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I run over my books once in six months, and 
find that you still owe me a bill rendered in January, 1892. Don't 
you want to close it? 

Yours truly, (39 words) 

Boston, Mass., Nov. 11, 1899. 
Mrs. Abigail Bayne, 
Chelsea, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Mr. Jenson wrote me on April 1, that he 
had executed and acknowedged a discharge of the Howe mortgage, 
and had forwarded it to you at Boston, Mass., for your signature, 
and that you would send it to me. Kindly do so at your early 
convenience. 

Yours truly, (55 words; 



LEGAL DICTATION 



Boston, Mass., Nov. 15, 1899. 

Mr. Osborn Nichols, 

Lynn, Mass. 
Dear sir: 

Please publish the enclosed once each week for 
three successive weeks and, after publication, send papers con- 
taining notice, and bill to me. 

Yours truly, (38 words) 

Boston, Mass., Nov. 23, 1899. 

Mr. William F. White, 

Lowell, Mass. 
Dear sir: 

I have your letter of this morning. I think 
Mr. Bacon must have misunderstood Mr. Irish. I was at the office 
when Mr. Irish telephoned Mr. Bacon. He asked Mr. Bacon if 
he would like me to report to him, if I had a customer. Mr. Irish 
then asked me if I would do so, and I replied that 1 would gladly, 
or do anything I could to hasten the settlement of Mr. Bradley's 
affairs. 1 have not a customer now, but if I find one, I will gladly 
report to you immediately. 

Very truly yours, (112 words) 

Seattle, Wash., December 1, 1899. 

Mr. J. S. Sprague, 

San Francisco, California. 
Dear sir: — 

Please inform me by return mail whether Jones 
& Clark have effected a composition with their creditors, and the 
full terms of the composition, and if a proposition for a com- 
position has been confirmed by the court. 1 am not sure by your 
letter of the 8th whether Jones & Clark are effecting a composi- 
tion under the composition act or outside of the insolvency court. 
Yours truly, 
(85 words) Waldo Emerson. 



22 LEGAL DICTATION 



Providence, R. I., October 18, 1899. 
Mr. L. J. Carson, 
Salem, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I thank you for a copy of Mrs. Plummer's will 
and a copy of your objections. I have no criticisms to make. I 
can not, however, see any chance of sustaining any appeal. 
Yours truly, 
(54 words) Charles Francis Adams. 

Tucson, Ariz., October 25, 1899. 
Messrs. Drake & Henry, 

St. Louis, Mo. 
Dear sirs: — 

I think the jewelry has already been returned to 
Mrs. Turner. You will remember that 1 wrote you some time ago, 
that Mr. Turner was ready to deliver all but one ring, if Mrs. 
Turner returned some of his household furniture, and that the 
whole matter was left with Dr. Cutler. 
Yours truly, 
(72 words) Henry Callender. 

San Francisco, Cal., October 14, 1899. 
Mr. Henry Cook, 

Somerville, New Jersey. 
Dear sir: — 

Mrs. Swallow's two mortgages held by Mr. 
Buck and myself as trustees now amount to $8500.00. The first 
mortgage stipulates that you shall carry the insurance for $2 500.00; 
the second one, that you shall keep the building insured for $4500; 
making a total of $7000.00. The mortgage has been reduced to 
$2000.00, so that $5000.00 insurance is probably enough to make 
us safe. Is it not better for you to carry more insurance as well as 
for us? 1 write this because I see the two policies amount to 
$4000.00 only. 

Yours truly, 
(130 words) Everett Buckminster. 



LEGAL DICTATION 23 



Asbury Park, N. J., October 31, 1899. 
Mr. Henry F. Knowles, 

105 William St., New York, N. Y. 
Dear sir: — 

Since I wrote you on October 2, 1 have seen Mr. 
James Glynn. He informs me that Mrs. Sarah Bryant will be in 
Yorktown soon. It will therefore not be necessary to send the 
deed to Italy for her signature. Please have the deed returned to 
me, at your early convenience. 

Very truly yours, 
(79 words) Amos Keith. 

Newbury port, Mass., October 23, 1899. 
Mr. Frank R. Kimball, 

89 Essex St., Salem, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

When the special precept in Wright v. Shaw 
was sent to you, 1 was absent from the office, and the directions 
were given by my assistant, who did not understand the matter. 
There are some boxes of glass in the Lawrence Mills, which were 
stored by Mr. Clarke. I wish you would attach these boxes. 
Make another service at once. All you will do is to attach the 
glass, and make a return to that effect. You cannot, of course, 
make any service upon the defendant, who is out of the Common- 
wealth. I enclose a letter from Metcalf & Matthews, which may 
help you to find the glass. 

Very truly yours, 
(134 words) Willard H. Brooks. 

Burlington, Vt., October 26, 1899. 
Mr. Amos Swift, 

Londonderry, Vt. 
Dear sir: — 

We will hear the mayor and aldermen of the 
City of Montpelier vs. the Vermont Central Railroad, on the petition 
to abolish grade crossings, on the twenty-fifth of November, 1899, 
at ten o'clock in the forenoon. 

Yours truly, 
(59 words) Stephen C. Holt. 



24 LEGAL DICTATION 



Orono, Maine, Oct. 20, 1899. 
Mr. William Lang, 

Providence, R. I. 
Dear sir: — 

Mr. Archibald informs me that he cannot attend 
to the hearing on the petition to abolish the grade crossings on Sat- 
urday, at ten o'clock. Kindly inform me when you can, as I would 
like to get the matter started before the summer vacation. 
Very truly yours, 
(61 words) W. F. Keane. 

St. Joseph, Mo., Oct. 20, 1899. 
Mr. D. G. Hart, 

Denver, Colorado. 
Dear sir: — 

You will remember that I called your attention 
the other day to the fact that Mr. Gibson refused to pay the ex- 
penses incurred by Mr. Jones in repairing a wagon belonging to 
R. O. Dutton Co., and that he also refused to pay the board of the 
horse. Mr. Jones is indebted to the firm for a small bill of 
merchandise, $3.86. Of course, he is willing to have this de- 
ducted from the amount due him. Will you have the kindness to 
ascertain from Mr. Gibson whether he proposes to pay Mr. Jones, 
and notify me, and oblige? 

Yours truly, 
(123 words) G. W. Bartlett. 

Pittsfield, Mass., Oct. 15, 1899. 
Mr. Henry Farnsworth, 

Maiden, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

In answer to my request, you sent me an 
attested copy of bill in equity, brought by J. Gordon against J. F. 
Flood, Kansas City. The bill recites that a copy of an agreement 
is annexed, and marked "R". No such copy is annexed to the 
certified copy of the bill which you forwarded. Please inform me 
if it is annexed to the file, and oblige, 

Very truly yours, 
(85 words) Alfred Denfield. 



LEGAL DICTATION 25 

Exeter, N. H., December 15, 1899, 
To the Clerk of the Probate Court for Suffolk Co., 

Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Enclosed please find proof of claim of Snow, 
Dow & Co., against Henry White. Kindly have the registrar 
acknowledge receipt, and inform me whether the claim is allowed. 
Very truly yours, 
($5 words) William Frost. 

Troy, N. Y., January 5, 1899. 
Mr. Charles G. Fiske, 
Syracuse, N. Y. 
Dear sir: — 

Please inform me whether you require any 
further proof from the Mechanics' National Bank, of its claims 
against E. A. Scott & Co. 

Yours truly, 
(44 words) Enoch Tenney. 

New York, N. Y., Dec. 4, 1899. 
Mr. John F. Farnham, 

23 Washington St., Boston, Mass. 
Dear Mr. Farnham: — 

Mr. James will inform your client what shipping 
property he held, if he will call at his office. He does not care to 
make out a list of the property to be shown to the whole of Nan- 
tucket. He says they are very gossipy people there. 
Very truly yours, 
(73 words) Robert Downing. 

Montpelier, Vt, April 15, 1900. 
Mr. Frank Rollins, 

Vicksburg, Tenn. 
Dear sir: — 

I have duly received your check for $62.00 in 
settlement of claim of Pearson, Parker & Co., against H. O. Gunn. 
Yours truly, 
(40 words) Everett Saltonstall. 



26 LEGAL DICTATION 

Baltimore, Maryland, February 10, 1900. 

Messrs. Bradford & Updike, 

Germantown, Philadelphia, Penn. 
Gentlemen: — 

The Columbian Grocery • Company has been 
fined by the Municipal Court of the Brooklyn District of the City 
of New York, for selling adulterated pepper. Smith bought this 
pepper from you as positively pure. It was so labeled. There 
were two fines of $18.00 each, one for white and one for black 
pepper. You realize, of course, that a grocer's business is very 
seriously damaged if he gets the reputation of selling impure goods. 
Smith has by reason of the complaint and his conviction, suffered 
a heavy loss, which he will expect you to make good. The 
two samples of pepper upon which he was convicted, were 
examined by an officer of the state, and pronounced adulterated, 
and are now in possession of the clerk of the Brooklyn court. I 
shall be glad to have you investigate the matter, and shall cer- 
tainly expect you to make good Smith's loss. Hoping to hear 
from you shortly, I remain, 

Very truly, 
(178 words) Charles F. Plummer. 



Springfield, Mass., May 23, 1899. 
Mr. Edward H. Bell, 

34 Bedford St., Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

1 think I neglected to sign each half sheet of Mur- 
phy's deposition. I remember that the commission required it, and 
intended to do so, but it has occurred to me that it slipped my mind. 
Kindly inform me whether the opposing counsel will waive 
that omission on my part, and if not, can trie deposition be taken 
from the files of the court and returned to me, so that I may com- 
ply with the commission? I regret exceedingly to have caused 
you any inconvenience in this matter. Yours of Oct. 23, enclos- 
ing check for $58.78, at hand, for which please accept thanks. 
Very truly yours, 
(134 words) Frank W. Rollins. 



LEGAL DICTATION 27 

Portland, Me., Sept. 9, 1900. 
Mr. George S. Brown, 

88 Humboldt Ave., Quincy, Illinois. 
Dear sir: 

Enclosed is a bill for services and disbursements to 
date; also deed to Mabel H. Potter. Please have Mrs. Potter sign 
and bring it to me at your convenience. 

Very truly yours, 
(52 words) Homer Nelson. 

Manchester, N. H., Aug. 28, 1900. 
Mr. Henry White, 

Fairfield, Maine. 
Dear sir: — 

1 enclose a bill for cash I have paid out in gas 
matters. In looking over the matter 1 think $1500.00 a fair charge 
for my services. 

Very truly yours, 
(49 words) John McCarthy. 

Hartford, Conn., September 28, 1898. 
Messrs. E. H. French & Son, 

Randolph, Mass. 
Dear sirs:— 

I wish you would file answer to interrogatories in 
Archibald Bros, and Lewis versus Robinson et al., and send me 
copy at your earliest convenience. 

Yours very truly, 
(48 words) Amos Perkins. 

Buffalo, N. Y., November 12, 1899. 
Mr. James Bryant, 

Newport, R. I. 
Dear sir: — 

1 just find that you gave a mortgage to Mr. 
Bond, on the eighteenth of October, 1875. Has this not been 
paid. Please write me by return mail. 

Yours truly, 
(50 words) Robert Burns. 



28 LEGAL DICTATION 

Albany, N. Y., December i, 1899. 
Mr. G. C. Haines, 

Butte, Montana. 
Dear sir: — 

I send you a rough draft of your father's will, 
and return the copy or the old will, which you left with me this 
morning. I have purposely made it brief; I think it is easily 
understood. If your father wishes this executed, let him return 
it to me, by mail, with such suggestions, if any, as he desires to 
make. 1 will then have the will prepared for signature. You 
understand, of course, that if your father survives both you and 
your mother, the will makes no disposition of his property. In 
that event it would all go to his brothers and sisters, by right of 
representation. 

Yours truly, 
(128 words) Theodore Evans. 



Dover, Maryland, Decembers 1899. 
Mr. James Fogg, 

Washington, D.C. 
Dear sir: — 

I have yours, containing a complete list of the 
vessel property of Joshua Scott, No. 3 and No. 4. Do you now 
object to my showing this to Mr. Burns and Mr. Mangle? 
Yours truly, 
(52 words) Thomas Brown. 

Boston, Mass., December 4, 1898. 
Mr. George Oatman, 
Springfield, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I certainly do not understand why you did not 
prove the claim as you were requested. Pray tell me how any- 
thing was to be gained by withholding it. As far as I can see it 
only enabled the debtors to carry through the composition. 
Yours truly, 
(62 words) John Smith. 



LEGAL DICTATION 29 



Cincinnati, Ohio, April 2, 1899. 
Mr. F. C. Miller, 

Springfield, Ohio. 
Dear sir: — 

Sometime before the dissolution of the firm of 
M. A. Stevens & Co., a horse used in the business became dis- 
abled. Mr. Sanders took him to his stable in Cleveland, and cared 
for him, and got him in condition tc work. He charged two dollars 
a week for the horse's board. The wa fe on in which the horse had 
been worked needed repairing; Sanders had the wagon repaired, 
and a bill of $15.75 was incurred. He delivered the horse, and gave 
an order to the carriage manufacturer, H. O. Ramsay, to deliver the 
wagon upon Smith's order. Now Smith refuses to pay repairs, and 
pay for the horse's board. This I consider pretty small business; what 
do you think? Sanders has been away; just returned this morn- 
ing. He has sent the debt to Smith, and has taken it out for his 
wife's signature. 

Yours truly, 
(166 words) J. F. Wyman. 

Toledo, Ohio, Jan. 1, 1900; 
Mr. F. H. Hemenway, 

Albany, N. Y. 
Dear sir: — 

I have your letter of December 31, and notice 
what you say about entering my office. In the short personal 
interview which we had the other day, I told you 1 wished 
someone who could be at my office at nine o'clock in the morning, 
and would be willing to remain until five o'clock, and who would 
give his attention to the business of the office. There is not always 
much to be done. Occasionally there is an opportunity to look 
up some interesting questions of law, which will take a student 
into the Law Library. There are also many small matters, of 
which 1 wish my assistant to assume the whole charge. It occurred 
to me that possibly you would not be content with the position 
of a clerkship for any length of time, not even for a year. You 
have had more experience than most young men who enter lawyers' 
offices, and no doubt are ambitious to start in on your own account. 
I do not wish to take anybody into the office, who will be unwilling 



30 LEGAL DICTATION 

to remain one year at least, if I desire it. I would like to know 
whether, in case I desire you to come, you think you would be 
contented to remain for that length of time. I will pay $50.00 a 
month, and if you have business of your own, you can undoubtedly 
attend to it, without interfering with mine; 1 should expect mine to 
receive the first attention, if occasion demanded it. 
Yours truly, 
(273 words) Walter T. Bates. 

Augusta, Maine, October 29, 1 899. 
Mr. Lucian Anthony, 

189 Dover St., Pittsburg, Penn. 
Dear sir: — 

Some time last winter, one of your patrolmen 
called at my office, and said it was necessary to have the ice and 
snow cleared from sidewalk opposite 87 Church St., owned by 
the Keystone National Bank. I told him to employ a suitable 
person to clear the ice, and he employed a colored man, named 
Graves. The bank wishes to pay Mr. Graves' bill, but has lost 
his address. I would thank you to give it to me, if you can 
ascertain it readily. 

Yours truly, 
(in words) Edward H. Sayward. 

Washington, D. C, October 25, 1899. 
Mr. Moses Black, 

New Bedford, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

Mr. Jones wrote me on March 1, that his clients 
would take $95.00, and no less, in settlement of their suit. This 
is 33 1-3 per cent, of their claim, $255.00, and costs, at ten dollars. 
The costs are taxable costs, for which you are liable, if they prove 
their claim. I had an interview with Mr. Jones at my office, yes- 
terday afternoon, and as a result, he said he should advise his 
clients to take the $95.00 without costs, if settled. Unless 
you can prove that you have not received the goods for which they 
sue, you will probably be obliged to pay interest for some little 
time, in addition to cost; and, upon the evidence that you have 



LEGAL DICTATION 



stated to me, you cannot, 1 think, establish anything on your de- 
position and set-off. I therefore advise you to accept this offer, 
and settle it at once. If you follow my advice and do settle, 1 
wish you to take the enclosed paper to Mr. Jones, and have him 
sign it. When signed, have it filed in court, so that the action 
may be disposed of. 

Yours truly, 
(219 words) W. A. Hunter. 

Exeter, N. Y., October 13, 1898. 
Mr. Henry Turner, 

Poland Springs, Me. 
Dear sir: — 

Mrs. Fuller's bill in equity to restrain the exec- 
utors from foreclosing the mortgage was to be heard tomorrow. 
Until this forenoon, 1 have been able to get no definite offer in 
settlement. I have just had an interview, however, with Mr. 
Gordon, who represents Mrs. Fuller. He offers $2000.00. It is 
barely possible he would offer more later. I have concluded to 
postpone the trial for one week, hoping to receive in the mean- . 
time, further instructions from you. Mr. Fuller, as you know, 
has disappeared. He undoubtedly forged many signatures before 
he left, and the court is likely to find, as you know, if Mrs. 
Fuller testifies with any positiveness, that her name is forged 
on the Rich mortgage and mortgage note. 1 have had a long 
interview with Mr. Kelley this morning, who has made a some- 
what careful examination of the matter, and who caused a com- 
plaint to be made against Mr. Fuller, for forging these signa- 
tures. He was present at the hearing in the Municipal Court and 
from all the evidence which was presented, he is thoroughly con- 
vinced that these signatures are not genuine. Immediately after 
the hearing, Fuller disappeared and I have not been able to learn 
where he is. The warrant issued, but has not been served, be- 
cause Fuller could not be found. I wish you to understand fully 
the situation, and shall be very sorry to lose this case, after hav- 
ing received so good an offer as $2000.00. You will very readily 
see that we are in a position of uncertainty, because we have no 
one who has witnessed her signature. Mr. Fuller himself, is a 



32 LEGAL DICTATION 



fugitive from justice, and if Mrs. Fuller swears at all positively, it 
will be very hard to meet her testimony. Kindly telegraph me 
as soon as you receive this, whether you will modify your in- 
structions first given me to accept fifty per cent, of the face of 
the claim, including interest 

Very truly yours, 
(348 words) J. H. Cabot. 

Concord, N. H., Oct. 20, 1899. 
Messrs. Flint & Snow, 

Boston, Mass. 
Dear sir: — 

I succeeded in finding Mr. Becker, counsel for the 
assignee of Hartnett, Fielding & Co., yesterday. He did not, 
however, have the deed of assignment in his possession, and- was 
not certain as to its provisions. Mr. Baxter called upon me this 
morning, and gave me opportunity to examine the deed of assign- 
ment. It is on the regular printed form, and is intended to secure 
substantially the same distribution of the assets of the assignors 
as would be made under the Insolvency Laws of this Commonwealth. 
The claims of all creditors who assent to the deed of assignment 
are absolutely barred and discharged. There is no provision in the 
deed which operates to cancel the lease, and so far as the deed of 
assignment goes, you can hold the lessees for all rents accruing 
subsequent to the deed. If, however, you should recognize the 
assignee as your tenant, that recognition might operate to cancel the 
lease. You will, therefore, be careful in making bills to Mr. Baxter 
for the use and occupation after the deed of assignment. Mr. Baxter 
informs me that the bill against you for work performed was after 
the deed of assignment, but I understand that the order was given 
before. There may be a grave question whether you are not, 
under these circumstances, obliged to pay in full for the work 
which he did, if what he states is true. I have told Mr. Baxter 
that I would advise you to assent to the deed of assignment on 
your merchandise account, first crediting the two hundred dollars 
for work, shown on the bill which you sent me. You would 
undoubtedly permit the assignee of Hartnett, Fielding & Co. to 
continue the business, if they would pay in full the rent accruing 
before the deed of assignment. From what I can learn, 1 think the 



LEGAL DICTATION 33 



debtors will probably succeed in making an arrangement by which 
they will continue the business, and if they do, they will want the 
premises. As the deed of assignment provides that the assent may 
be on the sheet itself, or on a separate paper, I think you had 
best write a letter to Baxter, substantially as follows: "We will 
assent to the deed of assignment from Hartnett, Fielding & Co., 
upon receipt of the balance due us upon open merchandise account, 
crediting our account with one hundred and fifty dollars for press 
work, as per bill dated Jan. 20, 1896. We will not, however, 
assent to the assignment of our claim for rent falling due under 
lease of the premises occupied by the debtors. " I return bill you 
sent me. 

Yours truly, 
(461 words) R. J. Damon. 

Trenton, N. J., Nov. 6, 1899. 
Mr. Daniel Barton, 

Springfield, Illinois. 
Dear sir: — 

Norris & Sons, soap manufacturers, of Maiden, • 
Mass., have mailed me what purports to be a copy of a petition 
filed in the Superior Court for the County of Middlesex, Mass., 
by the Eureka Manufacturing Co. vs. the American Grocery Co., 
both plaintiff and defendant being corporations organized under the 
laws of the State of Georgia. The plaintiff complains that it has 
adopted as a trade-mark for soap, the words "Magic Cleaner," and 
that the defendant has infringed upon the mark; at least, I think 
that the plaintiff means to make that complaint, although it is not 
distinctly alleged. It is clear to my mind that the defendant has 
not infringed upon the plaintiff's mark. The soap sold by the defen- 
dant is clearly and distinctly marked "Electric Cleaner, " and the 
name of Norris & Sons is clearly stamped upon each bar of soap. 
It seems to me that the only danger in this case is that Norris & 
Sons' wrappers are so similar to those of the plaintiff that an 
ordinarily prudent person may be deceived by the similarity, and 
be induced to purchase Norris' soap for that of the plaintiff. The 
rules governing the imitation of packages are quite clearly stated in 
the 26th American and English Encyclopedia of Law, page 462 : 



34 LEGAL DICTATION 



''Irrespective of a technical trade-mark, a manufacturei or trader 
has a right in the manner, style, and form in which he dresses his 
goods, to an extent sufficient to enable him to prevent other man- 
ufacturers of the same class of goods from adopting this same style 
of dressing, package, and manner of preparing the goods for the 
market, which will be likely to deceive an intending purchaser, 
and induce him to believe that he is buying the goods of the first 
manufacturer when receiving those of the infringer; and a rival 
trader has no right to beguile the buyer into buying his wares 
under the impression that he is buying those of a rival of estab- 
lished reputation; and this doctrine is extended to the protection 
of the form, shape, color, names, directions for use, location of 
labels, arrangement of wrappers, and all other indicia, which have 
the capacity of serving to identify the goods of a manufacturer as 
his own, and can impress the mind of a would-be purchaser who is 
to some extent familiar with the goods of the first adopter of these 
signs, into believing that in buying the goods of the second party, 
he is receiving those of the first adopter. "This of course comes 
under the doctrine of unfair competition in trade, and not of trade- 
marks strictly. To the same effect, notice: 

Jones vs. Baker, 42 Federal Reports, 423. 

Babbitt's Baking Powder vs. Jones, 18 Fed. Rep., 187. 

Minchin vs. Hamilton, 5 Fed. Rep., 680. 

Grimes vs. Crane, 108 U. S., 210 

Hildreth vs. Lathrop, 2 Dill., 684. 

Jones vs. Morse. 254 Mass., 251. 

The Meridian Co. vs. The Odell Mfg. Co., 57 Fed. Rep., 971. 

Though the cases which I have cited held that a defendant 
may be restrained from making use of a colorable imitation of a 
rival's label, they all recognize, 1 think, clearly, the fact that color 
and form alone do not constitute a valid trade-mark. Notice in 
addition to the cases cited in support of this proposition: 

Re Landreth in Brown Trade-Marks, s. 89 D. 

Payson's Indelible Ink in Brown, ss. 271-212. 

Phila. Novelty Mfg. Co., vs. Rowse, 40 Fed. Rep., 585. 

Phila. Novelty Mfg. Co. vs. Blakely Novelty Co., 40 Fed. 
Rep., 585. 

Fleischman vs. Starkey, 25 Fed. Rep., 127. 

Faber vs. Faber, 49 Barb., 357. 



LEGAL DICTATION 35 



It becomes a question of fact in my opinion, whether Norris's 
label is a colorable imitation of the plaintiff's. An inspection of 
the two wrappers discloses that upon each there are five watches, 
and each is of white paper, upon which there is printing in green 
colors; the shades of color, however, are different. There is no 
latin cross upon Norris's wrapper. In the centre are the words 
"Electric Cleaner" in an entirely different type from the words 
"Magic Cleaner." The words "Electric Cleaner" are surrounded 
by electric bolts, and there is nothing certainly in the type or in 
the matter about the words "Electric Cleaner" in Norris's wrapper 
which resembles in any way the words "Magic Cleaner" in the 
plaintiff's wrapper. The only point of resemblance, it seems to 
me, is that both use a shade of green, although there is a marked 
difference between them; and upon both are stamped or printed 
watches, although the watches are entirely different. The soap 
is put up in these wrappers, and when exposed for sale in a store, 
the prominent thing which strikes the eye, is the words "Electric 
Cleaner" and "Magic Cleaner." There is so great and striking a 
difference between them, that there is nothing here which has the 
slightest tendency to deceive. 1 think it will be of great assistance 
to the court which has to pass upon the question of whether 
Norris's label is a colorable imitation of that of the plaintiff, if he 
can have placed before him several bars of the two kinds of soap, 
and placed as they usually are in a country store. 

I notice that the plaintiff asks to have a temporary injunction 
issued, and that an order to show cause, returnable on the 29th 
of June, has already been issued. The court should not, of course, 
issue a temporary injunction unless the plaintiff will sustain an 
irreparable injury without such relief, and in this connection, I wish 
to say that Norris & Sons, who are the real parties defendant, and 
the only parties in interest, will furnish a bond with sureties to pay 
the plaintiff all damages that he may suffer by reason of the 
imitation of his label. 

Mr. Norris consulted me for the first time yesterday afternoon, 
and wished me to write a letter to counsel who have been engaged 
by the American Grocery Co., the nominal defendant. I have 
written this letter, which will be forwarded to the American 
Grocery Co., and by them delivered to you. I have also hastily 
prepared an answer which covers, I think, the principal points raised 



36 LEGAL DICTATION 



by the plaintiff's petition. I have admitted that the defendant 
has been using a label of which exhibit "A," attached to the 
plaintiff's petition, is a copy. You will, of course, be certain, before 
you make such admission, that the plaintiff has attached to his 
petition a true copy of the label. I shall be glad, at any time, to 
hear from you about this matter. 

Yours truly, 

Benjamin Glover. 
P. S. The draft of the answer is only intended to be of such 
service as it can be to you in framing yours. 
(i 197 words) 

Jacksonville, Fla., December 1, 1899. 
Mr. T. F. Church, 

Milford, New Hampshire. 
Dear sir: — 

1 forgot to mention to you yesterday the indebted- 
ness due Osborn, as trustee. The firm owed Osborn as trustee 
for the firm and one Backup, $12.00 or $13.00 when McKenzie 
died. Osborn also held a note of one of McKenzie's customers for 
for some $400.00, payable to him as trustee, and I understand Mr. 
Danford has collected a large part of this note. Of course Mr. 
Osborn does not claim this money for himself. All he desires is 
that Backup should have the part to which he is entitled for the 
amount due Osborn as trustee, at the time of McKenzie's death. 
He comes in with the other creditors, and will sign off at thirty- 
three and one-third cents. The amount collected must, of course, 
be paid in full. 

Yours truly, 
(1 54 words) Jefferson Gilmore. 



SPi 



LEGAL FORMS AND PLEADINGS. 



It has been the intention in the following pages to present 
as varied a collection of legal forms and « 'pleadings" as would be 
necessary for any stenographer in a law office to understand. 
All others may be written in similar style. The proper arrange- 
ment when typewritten has been indicated as closely as ordinary 
type would permit, and in some cases a variety of permissible 
forms are shown. 



38 LEGAL DICTATION 



WRIT. 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 
Suffolk, ss. 

To the Sheriffs of our Several Counties, or their Deputies: 

(L. S.) Greeting: 

We command you to attach the goods or estate of Elbridge 
Gerry and Samuel Miller, both of Boston, in said County, copartners 
under the firm name of Gerry and Miller, having a usual place of 
business in said Boston, to the value of Two Thousand Dollars, and 
summon the said defendants (if they may be found in your pre- 
cinct) to appear before our Justices of our Superior Court, to be 
holden in Boston, within and for our said County of Suffolk, on the 
first Monday of November next, then and there in our said Court 
to answer unto Bertram F. Randolph, of Brookline in our County 
of Suffolk, plaintiff in an action of contract: To the damage of the 
said plaintiff (as he says) the sum of Two Thousand Dollars, which 
shall then and there be made to appear with other due damages. 
And whereas the said plaintiff says that the said defendants have 
not, in their own hands and possession, goods and estate to the 
value of Two Thousand Dollars aforesaid, which can be come at to 
be attached, but have intrusted to and deposited in the hands and 
possession of the Boston Trust Company, a corporation duly estab- 
lished by law and having a usual place of business in said Boston, 
Trustee of the said Defendants' goods, effects, and credits to the 
said value: We command you therefore, that you summon the said 
supposed Trustee (if it may be found in your precinct) to appear 
before our Justices of our said Court, to be holden as aforesaid, to 
show cause, if any it has, why execution to be issued upon such 
judgment as the said Plaintiff, may recover against the said 
Defendants in this action (if any) should not issue against their 
goods, effects, or credits in the hands and possession of the said 
Trustee. 



LEGAL DICTATION 39 



And have you there this Writ with your doings therein. 
Witness William Gray, Esquire, at Boston, the thirtieth day of 
September in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and 
ninety-seven. 

EDWARD ESTES, Clerk. 
A true copy. 

Attest: John B. Adams: Deputy Sheriff. 



PETITION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR. 
To the Honorable the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court. 

County of Suffolk. 

Respectfully represents Bernard Jones of Chelsea in the County of 
Suffolk, that he is a resident and a citizen of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, of the age of twenty-one years, that he last studied 
law in the County of Suffolk, (at the Law School of Harvard 
University) and that it is his intention, if admitted as an attorney, 
to practise law in this Commonwealth. 

Wherefore he prays that he may be examined, and if found qual- 
ified, admitted to practise as an attorney, and by virtue thereof as 
a counsellor-at-law in any of the the courts of this Commonwealth. 

BERNARD JONES. 

I, Wilfred Collins, attorney of the bar of this court, certify that the 
facts stated in the foregoing petition are true to the best of my 
knowledge and belief; that the petitioner is a person of good moral 
character, and recommend that he be examined in accordance with 
the prayer of his petition. 

WILFRED COLLINS, 

; Attorney. 



40 LEGAL DICTATION 



Boston, September 13, 1899. 
William F. Brown, Esq., 

19 Essex St., Boston, Mass. 

DEAR SIR: — A claim against you for $450 has been placed in 
our hands for collection. Please call at once and settle this claim, 
and thus save yourself costs and further annoyance of a suit. 

Yours truly, 

JAMES F. TITCOMB. 



COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 

Suffolk, ss. Municipal Court of the City of Boston. 

Max Marcus 

vs. 

William F. Brown 

PLAINTIFF'S DECLARATION. 

First Count. And now comes the plaintiff and says that the 
defendant owes him the sum of four hundred and fifty dollars 
($450) for goods bargained, sold, and delivered, by the plaintiff to 
the defendant, according to the account hereto annexed. 

Second Count. And for the same cause of action, the 
plaintiff says that the defendant owes him the sum of four hundred 
and fifty dollars ($450), according to the account hereto annexed. 

By his attorney, 

JAMES F. TITCOMB. 



LEGAL DICTATION 4* 



Account Annexed: 


William F. Brown 


Boston, Mass., May 5, 1899. 
To Max Marcus, Dr. 


i Century Stanhope 5379 
1 Imperial. Trap 


$375-00 
250.00 


Cr. 

1 Top Buggy Pole 


$625.00 
$175.00 




$450.00 



DEFENDANT'S ANSWER. 

And now comes the defendant in the above-entitled action and 
denies every allegation in the plaintiff's declaration and writ 
contained. 

By his attorney, 

SIMON SAMUELS. 



COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 
Suffolk, ss. Municipal Court of the City of Boston. 

Max Marcus 

vs. 

William F. Brown 

The Boston National Bank, Trustee 

TRUSTEE'S ANSWER. 

And now comes the Boston National Bank, summoned as 
trustee in the above-entitled action, and says that, at the time of 



42 LEGAL DICTATION 



the service of the plaintiff's writ upon it, it had not in its hands or 
possession, goods, effects, or credits belonging to the defendant. 

By its attorney, 

WILLIAM WATERSON. 



DISCHARGE OF TRUSTEE. 

The Boston National Bank, summoned as trustee in the above- 
entitled case, may be discharged. 

JAMES F. TITCOMB, 

Attorney for Plaintiff. 



TRUSTEE'S ANSWER. 

And now comes the Boston National Bank, summoned as 
trustee in the above-entitled action, and says that at the time of the 
service of the plaintiff's writ upon it, it had in its possession the 
sum of four hundred thirty-nine and 47-100 dollars ($439.47) 
belonging to the defendant. 

By its attorney, 

WILLIAM WATERSON. 



LEGAL DICTATION 43 



BROWN vs. ANAN. 
PLAINTIFF'S DECLARATION. 



And the plaintiff says the defendant owns and operates by 
agents or servants divers express wagons in the City of Boston. 

And the plaintiff says that, on the 14th day of June, A. D. 
1897, the defendant by his agent or servant permitted one of the 
teams so operated, to remain on Hanover Street unattended and 
without precautions to prevent the horse attached thereto from 
starting and running along the street. 

That, while the agent or servant of the defendant was away 
said horse started, ran down Hanover Street onto the sidewalk of 
Washington Street, the forward part of the wagon striking a large 
glass window, before which the plaintiff was sitting, breaking the" 
same and scattering the broken glass over the person of the plain- 
tiff, injuring and severely wounding her, and causing to the plain- 
tiff great mental fear and suffering. 

And the plaintiff says she was in the exercise of due care, but 
that the defendant was negligent, and that said horse and team 
were so left unattended in contravention of law. 

And the plaintiff further says that, by reason of said injury, 
the has suffered greatly, both in mind and body, and has been put 
to large expense for medical attendance and nursing, all to her 
damage. 

By her Attorney, 

EDWARD L. TRAVIS. 



44 LEGAL DICTATION 



COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 



Suffolk, ss. 



Superior Court. 
June, 1899. 



C. S. Smith, ) 

) 
vs, ) Contract. 

) 

M. F. White ) 

PLAINTIFF'S DECLARATION 

And the plaintiff says that he is a dealer in foreign and do- 
mestic fruits and produce,having his usual place of business in Boston 
in said County of Suffolk; that on or about the twenty-third day 
of February, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine the defendant made 
an oral contract with the plaintiff for the sale of a lot of apples 
which were exhibited to the plaintiff by the defendant and were 
estimated by the defendant to contain about one hundred and fifty 
barrels. And the plaintiff says that the defendant offered to sell 
said apples at two dollars and sixty cents per barrel, and this 
offer was accepted by the plaintiff, who thereupon to bind said 
bargain paid the defendant the sum of twenty-five dollars. 

And the plaintiff further says that he performed his part of 
the contract in every particular, that he was ready and willing to 
take and pay for said apples as soon as they were ready for 
delivery by the defendant to the plaintiff. 

And the plaintiff further says that as soon as he ascertained 
from the defendant the exact number of barrels in the lot, he 
did pay the defendant for them, but the defendant wholly failed, 
neglected, and refused to deliver said apples to the plaintiff, where- 
by the plaintiff has suffered great loss and damage and seeks to 
recover therefor of the defendant. 

By his attorney, 

M. F. SARGENT. 



LEGAL DICTATION 45 



COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 

Municipal Court of the City of Boston. 
April 20, 1899. 
Suffolk ss. 



Giovanni Leopucci 

vs ) Contract. 

City of Boston 

PLAINTIFF'S DECLARATION. 

And the plaintiff says that he was employed as a laborer 
upon public works owned by the defendant City: sewer construc- 
tion work carried on under and by virtue of a contract between said 
defendant City and John McGinnis & Co., by whom the plaintiff 
was employed upon said work. And the plaintiff further says 
that said John McGinnis & Co. rightfully acted for and had 
authority from said defendant City in furnishing the labor of the 
plaintiff for said public work. And the plaintiff further says that 
within thirty days from the time he ceased to labor on said public 
work, he filed a written statement under his oath, of the amount 
of the debt so due him and the names of the parties or persons for 
whom and by whose employment the said labor was performed, 
said statement conforming to the requirements of Chapter 270 of 
the Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts for the year 1892, a copy 
of this statement being hereto annexed, marked "A." And the 
plaintiff says the defendant owes him twenty- five dollars and 
ninety-five cents for said labor. 

COUNT TWO. And the plaintiff says the defendant owes 
him twenty-five dollars and ninety-five cents according to the 
account hereto annexed, marked "B. " 

The above two counts are for one and the same cause of 
action. 

By plaintiff's attorney, 

EVERETT L. JONES. 



46 LEGAL DICTATION 



City of Boston 

To Giovanni Leopucci, Dr. 

Item 1. Jan. 26, 1899. To 19 2-9 days' labor per- 
formed on Sewer Construction work for John 
McGinnis & Co., contractors for said City of 
Boston, at $1.35 per day, $25.95 



COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 

Middlesex, ss. Police Court of Somerville. 

John Jackson vs. Samuel B. Kerriston et al. 

PLAINTIFF'S DECLARATION. 

And the plaintiff says, that on or about the seventh day of 
May, A. D. 1898, he was driving his horse and wagon along a 
public highway known as Summit Street in said Somerville, and 
was at the same time using due care, and the defendants were at 
the same time, by their servant, driving their team along the 
same highway, approaching the plaintiff's horse and wagon from 
an opposite direction, and not using due care, but carelessly and 
negligently did the defendants, by their servant, drive the said 
team, and by reason of such want of due care, and careless and 
negligent and unskilful conduct, the defendants' team was driven 
foul of and against the plaintiff's team, and the plaintiff's harness 
was detached from the horse and badly broken, and the plaintiff 
was put to expense in having the same repaired, and also delayed 
and injured in his business. 

By his attorney, 

JAMES C. SWIFT. 



LEGAL DiCTATION 47 



COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 

Municipal Court of the City of Worcester. 



Worcester, ss. 



M. Marcus & Company 



J. L. Hanson, et al. 



ANSWER OF THE DEFENDANT BRAZIER. 

And now comes the defendant John B. Brazier, and for 
answer, denies each and every allegation in the plaintiffs' writ and 
declaration contained. 

And further answering, the defendant says that he dwelt in 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts when the judgment de- 
clared on in the plaintiffs' declaration was recovered; that he then 
had no last and usual place of abode in the City of Minneapolis or 
in the State of Minnesota when the writ in said action was served; 
and that he was then an inhabitant of and dwelt in said Common- 
wealth of Massachusetts. 

This defendant further says that no legal service was made 
upon nim, and that said judgment has no force or effect in this 
Commonwealth, and cannot be enforced against him. 

By his Attorneys, 

BLACK & WHITE. 



4 8 LEGAL DICTATION 



COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 

Essex, ss. Superior Court. 

Emma L. Stevenson 

vs. 

Bay State Benefit Life Association 

and 
Garfield National Bank, Trustee. 



PLAINTIFF'S DECLARATION. 

And the plaintiff says that the defendant entered into a con- 
tract of insurance with one Edmund L. Stevenson, by the terms of 
which it agreed to pay five thousand dollars to Emma L. Steven- 
son, if living, in ninety days after satisfactory proof had been 
furnished to it of a valid claim under said contract, consequent upon 
the death of said Edmund L. Stevenson from any cause not enu- 
merated in the tenth paragraph of the conditions and rules con- 
tained in said contract of insurance, which contract of insurance 
was policy No. 98452. 

And the plaintiff further says that said Edmund L. Stevenson 
died on the first day of November, 1895, and that she has fur- 
nished satisfactory proof to the defendant" of a valid claim under 
said contract of insurance, consequent upon the death of said Ed- 
mund L. Stevenson; that her claim under said contract of insur- 
ance was duly approved by the defendant on or before the 19th 
day of March, 1 896, and that she is entitled to receive and recover 
from the defendant the said sum of five thousand dollars. 

By her attorney, 

MOSES T. FAIRBANKS. 



LEGAL DICTATION 49 



COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 

Hampshire, ss. 8542 Eq. 

Keene, et ah. 

vs. 
Kingman, et als. 

DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER. 
And now come the defendants and demur to the plaintiffs' 
bill, and assign the following causes for demurrer: 

First. That the plaintiffs have not set forth such a case as 
entitled them to equitable relief. 

Second. That the plaintiffs have a plain, complete, and 
adequate remedy at law. 

Third. That the plaintiffs' bill is multifarious. 

By their attorney, B. SHARPE. 

I, Benjamin Sharpe, attorney for the defendants in the above 
entitled cause, do hereby certify that the above demurrer sets 
forth sufficient grounds for judicial inquiry, and the same is not 
intended for delay. 

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 

Suffolk, ss. Superior Court. 

Graham 

vs 

Nelson, et al. 

PLAINTIFF'S DECLARATION. 

And now comes the plaintiff and says that while she was 
lawfully upon the sidewalk and highway of Warrenton Street, 
Boston, which sidewalk was on the premises of and bordering the 
estate owned by said defendants, and while she was lawfully 
walking on said sidewalk and exercising due care in so doing, Feb- 
ruary 7, 1898, she slipped and fell upon an accumulation of rough, 
hubbly, and rugged ice upon said sidewalk, and fractured her leg, 
and has suffered great pain and injury therefrom, and she says 
that said defendant carelessly and negligently left said sidewalk in 
said condition and allowed said ice to accumulate thereon. 
By her attorney, 

SAMUEL W. JOHNSON. 



50 LEGAL DICTATION 



Suffolk, ss. Superior Court. 

Fannie E. Thompson 

vs. 

Mary E. Manning. 

PLAINTIFF'S DECLARATION. 

Count i . And the plaintiff says that heretofore, to wit, on 
the 24th day of November, A. D. 1895, between the hours of 7 
and 8 in the evening of said date, the defendant owned or control- 
led a certain building situated on Tenth Street in that part of Boston 
known as South Boston in said Commonwealth, said building being 
numbered 35 on said Street. 

That on or before said date the defendant let certain rooms 
on the second floor of said building to one Evans, to be used by him 
as a habitation and place of abode. That on or about said date the 
said Evans was in the occupation of said premises on said second 
floor, and the defendant afforded and held out the halls and stairway, 
which stairway leads to and is on the first floor of said building 
running from said Tenth Street, as a proper and safe means of ac- 
cess to said rooms. And said Evans invited the plaintiff to enter 
said building and go to his said rooms on said second floor to trans- 
act business and do other acts of necessity or charity with the said 
Evans and his family, and the plaintiff did so at his invitation. 

And the defendant negligently kept said halls and stairway so 
unsafe and dangerous and so dark and unsufficiently lighted, that 
the plaintiff while departing from said rooms through said hall and 
stairway and down said stairway and using due care and diligence, 
was by their being so unsafe and dangerous, and so dark and un- 
sufficiently lighted, and by reason of the negligence of the defend- 
ant in keeping said hall and stairway in so unsafe and dangerous a 
condition and so dark and unsufficiently lighted, thrown down and 
made sick and severely and permanently injured in her body and 
mind, and put to great expense for medicine and medical attendance. 

And the plaintiff says that while in the exercise of due care 
and diligence as aforesaid, she had no knowledge of said conceaed 
danger, but that the defendant knew and by the exercise of pro er 



LEGAL DICTATION 5 1 



diligence on her part could have known or have reason to know 
that said passageway or stairway was dangerous, defective, and 
unfit to be put to the use for which it was put by the defendant at 
the time the plaintiff was injured, all to the damage of the plaintiff 
as she says in the sum of Ten Thousand (10,000) Dollars. 

Count 2. And the plaintiff says that the defendant owned 
and controlled a certain building situated on No. 35 Tenth Street 
in that part of Boston called South Boston, in said Commonwealth. 
That said building is rented by her to different persons as tenants 
at will. That one Evans hired and occupied the tenement on the 
second floor of said building. That on the lower floor of said build- 
ing occupied by said Evans and others as tenants at will is a narrow 
entry or passageway leading to a certain stairway, which stairway 
leads to the street door of said building. That said entry or pas- 
sageway and said stairway are provided by the defendant for the 
use of said tenants on the premises to be used by them as incident 
to the occupation of said premises. That said defendant has exclu- 
sive control of said entry or passageway or said stairway, and is 
bound to keep the same in repair for the use of said tenants, includ- 
ing the plaintiff. That said entry or passageway is improperly 
lighted, narrow, abrupt, and dangerous, and said stairway was suf- 
fered by the defendant to be left in a dangerous and defective con- 
dition, to wit, that the boards or steps which were part of said 
stairway were very badly worn, and the nails with which said 
steps were fastened unto said stairway protruded in so dangerous a 
manner as to make travel upon said stairway for the plaintiff and 
other occupants of said building hazardous and wholly unfit for the 
use intended. That the defendant, well knowing the dangerous 
condition of said stairway as aforesaid, suffered the same to so re- 
main on the 25 th day of November, A. D., 1895. That said de- 
fendant failed and unreasonably neglected to make proper repairs 
and to render the same safe for the use for which it was intended. 
That on or about the 24th day of November, A. D. 1895, 
between 7 and 8 o'clock on the evening of said day, the plaintiff 
being lawfully on said entry or passageway and in the exercise of 
due care and diligence, and because of the carelessness of the de- 
fendant aforesaid, fell down said stairway and suffered thereby 
painful and permanent injuries. And the said Evans invited the 
plaintiff to enter said building and go to his said rooms on said sec- 



52 LEGAL DICTATION 



ond floor to transact business and do other acts of necessity or 
charity with the said Evans and his family, who were tenants as 
aforesaid, and the plaintiff did so at his invitation. 

And the plaintiff says, while in the exercise of due care and 
dilligence as aforesaid, she had no knowledge of said concealed 
danger, but that the defendant knew, and by the exercise of proper 
diligence on her part could have known or have had reason to know 
that said passageway or stairway was dangerous, defective, and 
unfit to put to the use for which it was put by the defendant at the 
time the plaintiff was injured, all to the damage of the plaintiff as 
she says in the sum of Ten Thousand (10,000) Dollars. 

And the plaintiff says she was for a long time made sick 
and lame and unable to attend her ordinary duties, and was 
obliged to expend large sums of money for nursing and medical at- 
tendance, all to her great damage, 

By her attorneys, 

DEWEY & SCHLEY. 



DISCHARGE. 

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, 

That I, Hannah T. Poore, in consideration of fifty dollars to be paid 
by Benjamin Mills, Robert Mills and Samuel L. Mills, copartners in 
trade under the name of Mills Brothers (the receipt whereof is here- 
by acknowledged), do hereby remise, release and discharge ail 
claims and demands of whatever nature, either at law or in 
equity, which I now have or have had since the beginning of the 
world, against them or either of them. 

This is especially intended to release and discharge all claims 
growing out of an action now pending in the Superior Court for 
the County of Suffolk, in which I am the plaintiff and said Mills 
Brothers are the defendants. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and seal 
this twelfth day of June, A. D. 1899. 

HANNAH T. POORE. 
Signed and sealed in presence of 
WARREN HASTINGS. 



LEGAL DICTATION 



53 



COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 



Norfolk, ss. 



Superior Court. 



John Quincy Adams, 

Executor, 



James G. Blaine, 

Assignee. 



REPORT TO SUPREME COURT. 



This was a writ of replevin heard by the Court without a 
jury. Benjamin F. Butler carried on the business of tailoring on 
Winter Street in Quincy, and it appeared that in the month of 
August, 1889, he borrowed one thousand dollars from Ulysses S. 
Grant, his uncle, for which he gave a promissory note, a copy of 
which with the endorsements thereon is hereto annexed and 
marked ' 'Exhibit 1." At about the time said money was borrowed 
said Butler executed to said Grant a bill of sale of the stock of 
goods, fixtures, and other property in his said store, a copy of which 
is hereto annexed and marked ''Exhibit 2", and said Butler and 
Grant executed an agreement, a copy of which is hereto annexed 
and marked "Exhibit 3." Said note bore date August 11, 1889, 
said bill of sale, August 5, 1887, and said agreement, August 12, 
1889. 

1 find that said instruments though bearing different dates con- 
stituted parts of one transaction. The interest was regularly paid 



54 LEGAL DICTATION 



upon said note, as appears by the endorsements on the back thereof; 
and said note, bill of sale, and agreement were found among said 
Grant's papers at his decease. 

No delivery of the property mentioned in the bill of sale was 
ever made by said Butler to said Grant. The property mentioned 
in said bill of sale remained in the possession of Butler without 
delivery to Grant, Grant never having taken possession of the 
same, and the cloth was all made into garments and sold by Butler 
in the regular course of his business, and other goods were bought 
by Butler in his own name to place and keep in his store, and these 
again, were made into garments and sold to customers, and so on. 
The goods so subsequently bought by Butler were bought on his 
own credit, and in the purchase of them he used the proceeds of 
goods sold, his profits in the business, and other money inter- 
mingled, paying the expenses of the business from the same 
sources, and Butler continued to carry on the business at said 
store in his own name, purchased goods in his own name in the 
manner above stated, and sold the same from time to time, and 
traded the safe away for another safe, but upon what terms did 
not appear, so that at the time of the assignment and service of 
the replevin writ hereinafter mentioned, the stock of goods which 
Butler had in the store and the safe there were not the same that 
were covered and described by the bill of sale; and it did not 
appear whether the amount and value of the goods replevied was 
more or less than that included in said bill of sale, or how the 
same compared in amount and value, or to what extent the goods 
replevied had been purchased by the proceeds of goods sold, or 
to what extent by profits or other money. The fixtures were the 
same. On October 23, 1898, Butler executed to the defendant 
a common law assignment of ail his property, including stock of 
goods, fixtures, and safe then in the store, for the benefit of his 
creditors, and the same was duly assented to by the requisite 
number of creditors, and the provisions of law in regard to the 
same complied with. The defendant took possession of said pro- 
perty, including said stock and fixtures and safe then in the store, 
and was about to sell the same when the same was replevied in 
the present action. Plaintiff is the executor of Ulysses S. Grant. 
Upon the above facts the Court ruled that no trust was established 



LEGAL DICTaTION 55 



in favor of the plaintiff in the property replevied except in the 
fixtures, and as to all other property ordered a return to the 
defendant with damages, but found that there was a trust estab- 
lished in the fixtures and found for the plaintiff in replevin for said 
fixtures. 

1 report the case to Supreme Judicial Court, for determination 
of the questions of law involved. If the rulings and findings or 
either of them were erroneous, they are to be set aside, reversed, 
or modified, and such order entered as the Court shall determine; 
otherwise judgment shall be entered upon the findings. 



Suffolk, ss. Superior Court. 

John Quincy Adams, In Replevin, 
-v.- 
James G. Blaine, Assignee. 

AMENDED FINDING AND FURTHER FINDING. 

In the above entitled case the Court finds for the plaintiff as 
to six chairs, one desk, one cutting-table, three counters, one 
mirror, one oak table, one black walnut table, one clock, picture 
frame and rods, and finds for the defendant for all the other goods 
and chattels mentioned in the plaintiff's writ, to wit, about two 
hundred pieces of suitings, vest and pant patterns, all trimmings, 
and all other goods of every kind of material mentioned in said 
writ, and one safe, and orders a return to the defendant of all said 
last-mentioned goods, with damages in the sum of $50.69. 



56 LEGAL DICTATION 



COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 

Middlesex, ss. Court of Insolvency. 

FINAL REPORT 

Of Henry W. Chapman, surviving assignee of David T. HilL 



Since filing my last account, I have sold the only remaining 
property of the estate of said insolvent, remaining to be disposed of. 
This consisted of a large tract of land situate in West Virginia, and 
known as the Van Buren Furnace Property. 

I have made many efforts to sell this real estate. It was 
reported to contain valuable deposits of manganese ore, and was, 
when the debtor was adjudged insolvent, covered with oak trees. 

Several intending purchasers have made extensive explorations 
to discover the deposits of manganese, but all these intending pur- 
chasers failed to find a deposit in sufficient quantity to justify the 
purchase of the property for the purpose of mining this ore, and all 
my efforts to sell the property to such purchasers failed. 

To further satisfy myself as to the value of this land, I sent a 
Mr. Smith, an expert in the value of real property, to West 
Virginia to examine this land, and he reported to me that this land 
was situate twelve miles from the nearest railroad and was barren 
and mountainous, and was so situated and the soil was of such 
quality that it was of little value, and that it would be exceedingly 
difficult to sell it for any considerable sum. 

Having been unable to sell the property for mining purposes, 
I next directed my attention to the disposition of the bark upon the 
oak trees, and after many efforts I succeded in selling the bark 
for five thousand dollars, which was accounted for in my last 
account 

After having sold the bark from the trees, there remained 
simply a barren and mountainous area, which was of little value and 
exceedingly difficult to dispose of. 



LEGAL DICTATION 57 



Some two years ago, an intending purchaser made a 
deposit to cover a contemplated purchase, but before the time 
came for taking the property, he died, and this purchase fell through. 

Since his death, I have made many attempts to sell this land, 
and have had many bargains nearly or quite completed, but have 
never succeeded in closing a sale of the property until recently, 
when 1 sold it for the sum of ten hundred and fifty dollars. I, 
however, realized the sum of thirteen hundred and fifty dollars from 
the sale of this land, as the intending purchaser who died had 
previously made a deposit on which there was a forfeit to the estate 
of three hundred dollars. 

Although I have realized but thirteen hundred and fifty dollars 
from the sale of this land, after the bark was stripped from the trees, 
it has involved a very extensive correspondence with would-be 
purchasers outside the state and many interviews with people in 
Boston, and has altogether taken a good deal of time and attention, 
and I think that four hundred dollars is a fair and reasonable com- 
pensation for my services rendered to this estate since the filing of 
my last account. 

HENRY W. CHAPMAN, 



Assignee. 



Bristol, ss. Superior Court. 

Lewis G. Thayer 

vs. 

Dighton, Somerset & Swansea St. Ry. Co. 

REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT. 

This is an action of tort for personal injuries sustained by the 
plaintiff on July 18, 1899, by reason of the alleged negligence of 
Dr. Amos T. Hanley, who, as the plaintiff claimed, was employed 
by the defendants to make a physical examination of the plaintiff for 



58 LEGAL DICTATION 



the benefit and information of the defendant. The pleadings may 
be referred to. The action was tried before me sitting with a jury. 

There was evidence tending to prove the following facts: 
Before May 14, 1899, the plaintiff was strong and vigorous and 
had never been lame, nor suffered from hysteria of any kind, and 
had been engaged in hard work; and that on May 14, 1899, the 
plaintiff was injured by falling or being thrown from a car of the 
defendant in Dighton, while a passenger upon said car, and that 
his left leg was badly bruised by said fall, and that his left 
leg become swollen. On June 1, 1899, the plaintiff brought 
an action against the defendant to recover damages for personal 
injuries received by him in said accident, and while said action 
was pending, to wit on July 18, 1899, Dr. Amos T. Hanley 
made a physical examination of the plaintiff, not for the information 
or advantage of the plaintiff, and which Dr. Hanley represented 
to be on behalf of the defendant. 

To prove that Dr. Hanley was acting by orders of the 
defendant on its behalf, the plaintiff ordered interrogatories filed 
in this case to the president of the defendant corporation, under 
P. S. ch. 167, sec. 49 et seq., and his answers thereto. The fourth 
interrogatory and the answers thereto were as follows: 

"On or about the eighteenth day of July, A. D. 1899, was 
not one Amos T. Hanley employed as a physician or surgeon by 
and on behalf of said Dighton, Somerset & Swansea Street Railway 
Company to make a physical examination of Lewis G. Thayer, 
then residing on Webster Avenue in Dighton in said County of 
Bristol? 

"Answer. 1 have no personal knowledge as to the matters 
inquired of, but 1 am informed and believe that Dr. Amos T. 
Hanley was employed by the defendant company to examine the 
plaintiff in this case." 

There was evidence tending to prove that for about three 
weeks after the car accident, the plaintiff suffered considerable 
pain in his left leg and back and his left leg was swollen, weak, 
and lame, and he was unable to walk without a cane or crutch. 
The plaintiff than began to improve, and continued to gain slowly 
but steadily up to the time of Dr. Hanley's examination on July 
18, 1899. Prior to this examination, the plaintiff had no attack 



LEGAL DICTATION 59 



of crying and laughing without cause, or any other symptoms of 
hysteria. 

The plaintiff consented to the examination, understanding it to 
be on behalf of the defendant, and on the morning of July 18, 
1899, the examination was made at the plaintiff's house in Dighton, 
by Dr. Hanley. There were present at the examination, the 
plaintiff, Dr. Hanley, and Dr. William Murray, the plaintiff's 
physician, and Mrs. Thayer was present part of the time in that 
room and a part of the time in an adjoining room. The plaintiff, 
Mrs. Thayer, and Dr. Murray in substance testified that Dr. Hanley 
commenced his examination of the plaintiff in the sitting-room and 
concluded it in the bed-room, both rooms being in the second story 
of the house. In the sitting-room Dr. Hanley examined the plain- 
tiff with his clothes on; in the bed-room the plaintiff was stripped 
of all his clothes except his drawers and shirt, and placed upon 
the bed. Dr. Hanley then examined the plaintiff's left leg and 
other parts of his person upon the bed, and afterwards told the 
plaintiff to get up from the bed and to stand upon the floor of the 
bed-rooom. The plaintiff accordingly arose and stood upon the floor. 
Dr. Hanley then directed the plaintiff to stand upon his right leg; 
which the plaintiff also did. Dr. Hanley then directed the plaintiff 
to stand upon his left leg, to which the plaintiff replied that he 
could not do so. Dr. Murray also informed Dr. Hanley that the 
plaintiff could not bear his weight upon his left leg. Dr. Hanley 
then told the plaintiff to try standing upon his left leg. The 
plaintiff accordingly tried to stand upon his left leg, and immediately 
collapsed and fell to the floor in a heap, with a heavy thud which 
shook the whole house. 

The plaintiff offered to prove by Dr. Murray that upon the 
same day of the examination, shortly after the examination, Dr. 
Hanley said to Dr. Murray that the plaintiff would be well in a 
few weeks. Upon the defendant's objection, I ruled that such 
evidence was incompetent; to which ruling the plaintiff duly 
excepted. 

The plaintiff's evidence further tended to prove that the day 
after Dr. Hanley 's examination, the plaintiff had an attack of crying 
and laughing without cause, and talking wildly, and that he became 



6o LEGAL DICTATION. 



unconscious, and had many like attacks afterwards, that shortly after 
Dr. Hanley's examination a marked change for the worse was 
observed in the plaintiff's appearance and condition, and that he 
was seen in hysterical attacks of crying and laughing and talking 
wildly, generally followed by unconsciousness and exhaustion, 

Dr. William Murray, the plaintiff's physician, testified to his 
frequent attendance upon him and to his condition, and that in 
his opinion the plaintiff was suffering from traumatic hysteria, and 
that he would never be well, or able to work again; and that the 
plaintiff's condition was in his judgment, caused by the two falls, 
— one fall from the car on May 14, 1899, and the other fall 
during Dr. Hanley's examination on July 18, 1899, that in his 
opinion the plaintiff would have entirely recovered from the effects 
of the car accident in a few months if he had not suffered addition- 
al injuries. 

Dr. Murray further testified that he was present during Dr. 
Hanley's examination on July 18, 1899; and the plaintiff offered 
to prove by him that Dr. Hanley did not conduct the examination 
in a careful or skilful manner. I ruled that such evidence was 
incompetent, and the plaintiff excepted to this ruling. 

There was no other material evidence except upon the question 
of damages. 

At the close of the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff, I ruled, 
at the request of the defendant, that the plaintiff could not recover, 
and directed a verdict for the defendant, which the jury returned. 

The plaintiff duly excepted to this ruling and direction, and at 
the plaintiff's request, I report the case for the consideration of the 
Supreme Judicial Court; if said rulings and direction were right, 
judgment to be entered for the defendant; otherwise, a new trial 



to be granted. 



CHARLES S. ROSE, 

Justice Superior Court. 



LEGAL DICTATION 6 1 



COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 

Municipal Court of the 
Suffolk, ss. City of Boston. 

WILLIAMS v. JONES. 
Petition for the Vacation of Judgment. 

To the Honorable the Justices of the Municipal Court of the City of 
Boston within and for the County of Suffolk. 

Respectfully represents your petitioner, Robert P. Jones of 
Holliston, in the County of Middlesex, that he is the defendant in a 
certain action of contract, in which Michael Williams of said Bos- 
ton is plaintiff; that the plaintiff sued out his writ on the twenty- 
sixth day of April, 1898, returnable on the twenty-first day of May, 
1898, and that at a sitting of said Court, holden in Boston, on the 
twenty-fourth day of May, 1898, your petitioner was defaulted in 
said action; and thereafter on the twenty-seventh day of May, 1898, 
judgment was entered for the plaintiff in said action, and on the 
thirty-first day of May, 1898, execution -was issued against the 
defendant in the sum of one hundred dollars as damages and eight 
dollars and seventy-seven cents costs of suit, which has not been 
satisfied in whole or in part. 

And your petitioner further says that the officer made a false 
return on said writ; that said writ was not served in hand, as stated 
in the return thereon, and said defendant was then, and had been 
for some time residing in said Holliston; that no service of said writ 
was ever made upon him, and he had no actual knowledge of the 
pendency of said action against him, before said judgment was 
entered, and that he believes he has a good defence to said action. 

Wherefore your petitioner prays that judgment may be 
vacated, and a stay of proceedings or supersedeas issue. 



COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 

Middlesex, ss. July 2, 1900, 

Then personally appeared the said Robert P. Jones and made 
oath that the above statements by him subscribed are true, except- 
ing those made on information and belief, and those he believes to 
be true. Before me. WILLIAM PIERCE, 

Justice of the Peace. 



62 LEGAL DICTATION 



COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 

Superior Court. 
Suffolk, ss. 

Between 

ASA R. WALTON, of Boston, in said County of Suffolk, as he is 
the trustee in bankrptcy of the estate of James T. Thomas, 
a bankrupt, 

Plaintiff, 
and 

Elizabeth E. Thomas, wife of said James T. Thomas, and 

GEORGE P. BURNS, and ABBIE B. CHAPIN, all of Cambridge, 
in the County of Middlesex, 

Defendants. 



BILL OF COMPLAINT. 



1. Said James T. Thomas was on the twenty-first day of Sep. 
tember last past adjudged a bankrupt by the judge of the Dis- 
trict Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, 
and on the eighth day of December following, the plaintiff was 
duly appointed trustee of the estate of said bankrupt. He 
accepted said trust, and qualified as trustee by giving bond with 
sureties approved by the court, and is now acting as such trustee. 

2. The plaintiff is informed and believes, and alleges upon infor- 
mation and belief, that said James T. Thomas was on or about 
the first day of March last past, and for a long time prior thereto 
had been, the owner of two certain parcels of land situate on Eaton 
Street in said Cambridge, upon which were a store, storehouse, 
and barn; that he had for many years prior thereto conducted a 
retail grocery and provision business in said store, and on or about 
said first day of March owned a valuable stock of groceries and 
provisions, and certain fixtures then in said store, and horses, 
harnesses, wagons, and sleighs, and other pergonal property used 
by him in the conduct of his said business; that he then owned 
little other property, and was then indebted to divers other persons 



LEGAL DICTATION 63 



in the sum of seven thousand seven hundred sixty-seven dollars 
and fifty cents ($7,767.50) for merchandise bought for the conduct 
of his business; that on or about said first day of March said James 
T. Thomas sold said land, buildings, and stock in trade, to the 
defendant Burns; and that, in consideration of said sale, said Burns 
paid said James T. Thomas the sum of two thousand dollars in cash, 
and agreed to pay to the defendant Elizabeth E. Thomas the further 
sum cf three thousand dollars, and assumed a mortgage of three 
thousand dollars upon said land. 

3. The plaintiff is informed and believes, and alleges upon infor- 
mation and belief, that said James T. Thomas, by an agreement with 
the defendant Burns conveyed said real property to the defendant 
Abbie B. Chapin. The plaintiff is not, however, fully cognizant 
of the agreement by which said land was conveyed by said James 
T. Thomas to the defendant Abbie B. Chapin, and therefore can- 
not fully set forth the same. 

4. The plaintiff is informed and believes, and alleges upon infor- 
mation and belief, that said James T. Thomas was insolvent on or 
about said first day of March, when he sold said property to the 
defendant Burns, and conveyed said real property to the defend- 
ant Abbie B. Chapin, and that he sold and conveyed the same for 
the purpose of putting the same beyond the reach of his creditors, 
with the intent to hinder, delay, and defraud them 

5. The plaintiff further alleges upon information and belief that 
the defendants Burns and Chapin knew that the said James T. 
Thomas was insolvent, and knew that he sold and conveyed the 
same for the purpose of hindering, delaying his creditors, and put- 
ting the same beyond their reach. 

6. The plaintiff is informed and believes, and further alleges upon 
information and belief, that the defendant Burns has paid to the 
defendant Elizabeth E. Thomas a small part only of the sum of 
three thousand dollars which he promised to pay her on account of 
said purchase from said James T. Thomas. 

The Plaintiff Prays: 
1. That the defendants Burns and Chapin be restrained by order 

of this court from conveying any part of the property deeded or 
conveyed to them, or either of them, by said James T. Thomas, 



64 LEGAL DICTATION 



and that the defendant Burns be restrained by order of this court 
from paying any further sums of money to the defendant Eliza- 
beth E. Thomas, on account of said purchase; 

2. That the defendant Hunt be ordered to convey to him ali said 
real property conveyed to her by said James T. Thomas; 

3. That the defendant Burns be ordered to pay the plaintiff the 
full value of all the personal property conveyed to him by the 
said James T. Thomas, which he has sold, disposed of, or converted 
into cash; 

4. That the plaintiff may have such further and other relief as in 
justice and equity he is entitled. 

ARTHUR B. COOPER, 

Solicitor for Plaintiff. 



COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 

Suffolk, ss. 

December 28, 1899. 

Then personally appeared the above named Asa R. Walton, 
and made oath and said that he has read the foregoing bill and 
knows its contents, that the matters therein stated to be true are 
true, and those stated upon information and belief he believes to be 
true; before me, 

ARTHUR B. COOPER, 

Justice of the Peace. 



NOTICE is hereby given that the subscriber has been duly 
appointed administratrix of the estate of ANNA S. BRIGGS, late 
of Boston, in the County of Suffolk, deceased, intestate, and has 
taken upon herself that trust by giving bond, as the law directs. 

All persons having demands upon the estate of said deceased 
are required to exhibit the same, and all persons indebted to said 
estate are called upon to make payment to 

OLIVE E. CHAP1N, Admx., 

Boston, July 26, 1900. (Address) 4 Porter Street. 



LEGAL DICTATION 65 



COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 

Suffolk, ss. Superior Court 

WILLIAM D. BAKER 



MARTIN A. MOREY et al. 



Defendants' 1 Bill of Exceptions. 

This is an action of contract to recover $1062.50, being a 
part of the commission received by the defendants from the 
exchange of a piece of real property situate in Brookline, called the 
Watson Estate, for a piece of property on Arlington Street, Boston, 
called the Hotel Lincoln. 

The declaration contained three counts : One upon a written 
agreement; the second upon account annexed; and the third upon 
an arbitration and an award. There was no evidence of an award, 
and the third count was abandoned. 

The pleadings may be referred to. 

At the trial of the cause, it appeared that the defendants were 
real estate brokers and copartners, and had for some three years 
had their usual place of business at 53 State St., Boston. In the 
fall of 1896, they advertised for assistants, and in answer to the 
advertisement, the plaintiff called at the office of the defendants; 
and then made an oral agreement for employment, upon which he 
immediately entered. 

The plaintiff testified that, by this agreement, he was to work 
for the defendants on half commission on sales or exchanges of 
property which he could find in Brookline and Brighton and carry 
to their office, and that half commission was to be full pay for all 
the work that he did for them; and that, after he had been some 



66 LEGAL DICTATION 



time in the employ of the defendants, they gave him, at his re- 
quest, a written agreement of which the following is a copy: 

"We, the undersigned, hereby agree to allow William 
D. Baker of Brookline, Mass., one-half of the commission 
collected on all sales of property in Brookline and Brighton, 
brought into the office by him, or collected through customers 
for property in those sections secured by him. 

Said Baker is to spend his time in building up the firm's 
list of property in the above sections, and the above stated 
share of commission shall be in full for such service. 

(Signed) MARTIN A. MOREY, 

WILLIAM J. McKINLEY. 

Early in April, 1897, and while the plaintiff was in the em- 
ploy of the defendants, under the foregoing written agreement, 
Joseph Smith and Thomas Peters, trustees under the will of one 
John Evans, owned a piece of land on Washington Street in Brook 
line, which they were willing to sell or exchange. 

At the same time, one Arthur Jones owned a lot of land upon 
which was a family hotel, situate on Arlington Street, Boston, out- 
side of the Brighton district. 

After much negotiation, an agreement for an exchange of 
these properties was effected. 

Before the exchange of the properties was made, it was agreed 
by and between defendants Morey and McKinley and the trustees 
of the Evans estate that the whole commission paid by the trustees 
should be $3500.00, less certain charges, not to amount to more 
than $900.00, in replacing a mortgage upon the Boston property. 

One Brown, who was also a real estate broker, represented 
Mr. Jones, and he insisted that, if there was an exchange of pro- 
perties, he should have one-half of the net commission paid by the 
Evans estate on the Brookline property. 

The plaintiff was informed by the defendants that, if the 
exchange was made, one-half of the commission from the Evans 
estate must be paid to Mr. Brown, and he assented to the payment. 

So soon as the commission was paid, the defendants paid to 
the plaintiff one-half of all the net commission received from the 
Evans estate on the Brookline property. 



LEGAL DICTATION 



6/ 



When the exchange was made, it was agreed by and between 
Brown, the defendants, and Jones, that if Brown or the defendants 
should place mortgages agregating $100,000 upon the Brooklyn 
property conveyed to him by the trustees of the Evans estate, he 
should pay them a commission of $4250 on the Boston property, 
and that, if they failed to place these mortgages within ninety 
days, he should pay no commission; and at the same time, it was 
agreed by and between Brown and the defendants that, in case 
Mr. Jones paid this commission, it should be equally divided be- 
tween Brown and defendants. 

The plaintiff testified that, in consideration of his assent to 
the division of the commission from the Evans estate, the defend- 
ants promised to pay him one-half of the net commission which 
they might thereafter receive from Mr. Jones. This the defend- 
ants denied. 

Upon the cross-examination of Brown, who was a witness for 
the defendants, and of the defendants, it appeared that it was 
customary for brokers, in the case of sale or exchange of property, 
to divide commissions, but that he refused to recognize the plaintiff 
as a broker because he was the defendants' clerk. 

The defendant asked the Court, among other things, to in- 
struct the jury that the plaintiff could not recover under any cus- 
tom or usage of brokers to divide commissions. 

This ruling the Court refused to give, and upon this point 
instructed the jury: 

"But the trouble comes over the commission on the hotel 
property. The plaintiff says that, under his agreement and also 
by the custom of the trade among brokers, he was entitled to 
one-half of that commission. The defendants say that he has 
nothing to do with it; that he was not entitled to it at all. That 
is just where the whole thing is. Now, so far as the law is con- 
cerned, what part of the whole sum — what part of the whole sum 
of the two commissions — was the Brookline property entitled to? 
Well, now, if there was an agreement between the parties and 
consented to by Baker, that these two properties should be pooled 
— the commissions pooled — and that the Brookline parties should 
have half and the others half, then the Brookline property would 
be entitled to one-half, because that would be the arrangement. 



68 LEGAL DICTATION 



If that was the custom, or if that was the agreement, between 
Baker and Brown and the other brokers, if it was all consented to 
and agreed to, or if that was the understanding and the custom 
of brokers when two things were put together and it was known 
and understood by all these parties that the commission should he 
pooled and divided, why, then of course the Brookline property 
was entitled to one-half and the hotel property to one-half — and 
when I say that, I mean the representatives. That is really 
where the whole question is. How much of this whole commission 
was earned by the Brookline property? If it was only what came 
from the Brookline, this plaintiff has had his pay and has nothing 
to complain of. But if, on the other hand, either by the agree- 
ment of parties or the custom of brokers — an established custom 
of brokers, which was known to parties, that when a trade was 
made like that, the two were to be pooled and then to be divided 
— then one-half would belong to the Brookline and one-half to the 
hotel property. It seems to me that is where the whole case rests, 
and that is what you are to determine." 

"What I have said — unless there was an agreement or under- 
standing that they should be pooled — that is, if there was an 
agreement between the parties, Baker consenting to it, that the 
properties should be pooled and the commission divided, then I 
instruct the jury that one-half the commission would belong to the 
Brookline property and one-half to the Boston property; or if there 
was a well-established custom among brokers, known to all the 
parties, Baker and the other parties, then they would be bound 
by that." 

To the refusal of the Court to give the ruling requested, and 
to the Court's instruction to the jury upon the plaintiff's right to 
recover under a custom, and to all that portion of the charge which 
is incorporated in their bill of exceptions, the defendants duly ex- 
cepted, and pray to have their exceptions allowed. 



By their Attorney, 

AMOS ARNOLD. 



LEGAL DICTATION 69 



Berkshire, ss. Superior Court. 

ARTHUR H. RAYMOND 



FREDERIC R. PUTNAM. 



PLAINTIFFS EXCEPTIONS. 

This was an action of contract to recover for merchandise sold 
and delivered to the defendant. The sale, delivery and non-pay- 
ment of the bill were admitted, but the defendant pleaded in bar 
his discharge in bankruptcy under the U. S. Bankruptcy Law of 
1896, on his petition filed shortly after the date of the last item in 
the plaintiff's bill. It was admitted that the plaintiff's name did 
not appear on the defendant's schedules of creditors, and that he 
had no official notice of the filing of the petition nor of any of the 
meetings of creditors or other proceedings. 

The defendant claimed, however, and introduced evidence 
tending to show that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the pro- 
ceedings in bankruptcy. 

The plaintiff testified in substance as follows: That he had 
had the dealings with the defendant, and did not know that he had 
been through bankruptcy until some time in September, 1899. A 
paper a copy of which is hereto annexed marked "A," was shown 
to the witness, who testified that the first time that he saw it was 
during the preparation for the former trial in this case. On cross- 
examination he testified that the paper was left at his place of 
business, and had been there since July 7, 1899, when it was left 
by Mr. Hammond. 

Q. He saw you about it? A. I imagine so. 

Q. No doubt about that? A. 1 don't deny that. 

Q. What time in the day did he come with it? A. Some 
time in the afternoon, I should think. 

Q. Talk with you? A. Yes, sir. 



70 



LEGAL DICTATION 



Q. Had you ever seen him before? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. How many times? A. I think that was the second time. 

Q. When was the first time? A. Some time previously. 

Q. Had you known Hammond before that? A. No, sir. 

Q. The first time you saw him did he come down to your 
place of business? A. He might have been there. 

Q. The first time that you saw him did he come down to your 
place of business? A. Yes, sir. 

The witness further testified that Hammond came some time 
previous to the second time, to tell about Putnam's affairs; that 
Hammond said that Putnam was trying to arrange his affairs; that 
there was no talk about bankruptcy proceedings; that Hammond 
wanted witness to "sign off" at a percentage; that witness did not do 
so; that he came to the witness's place of business at some time 
considerably later; that witness did not hear him talk about any 
proof or claim; that Hammond came there with a paper; it might 
have been blank, might not, the witness could not say; that he 
asked witness questions, and among them what the firm's name 
was, and the witness told him "Arthur H. Raymond, doing business 
under the style of Raymond & Co."; that Hammond did some writ- 
ing; that he didn't think Hammond said anything about Putnam, 
but he did say that he was trying to fix up Putnam's affairs; that 
Hammond might have written this paper "Exhibit A," and he left 
paper on the witness's desk; that it was picked up with other pa- 
pers and put in a pigeon-hole; that nothing was said between the 
witness and Hammond as to what they were to do with the paper; 
that he didn't tell Hammond that he would go to the Court of 
Bankruptcy; that he did not refuse to take the paper, and did not 
ask Hammond to take it away; that it was simply left with him; 
that the witness did make some comment on Putnam that day; 
that he did not demand payment of his account against Putnam; 
that he didn't sell him any goods, and he could not say that he 
sent him a statement; that from the 7th of July, until he brought 
his suit he didn't say anything to Putnam about the claim, and did 
not ask him to pay it; that he did see Hammond after this, and did 
not tell him that he had or had not proved his claim; that he for- 
got all about the paper after it was left on his table; that he did 
not remember whether he or somebody else picked it up and put it 
in the pigeon-hole; that he would not read it; that he was disgust- 



LEGAL DICTATION 



71 



ed with the whole affair; that he was going to the train and had 
only a few minutes; that he did not know what it was; didn't 
know it was a blank proof of claim on the Putnam estate; that if 
he had thought of it again he would have read it; that he found 
it when he was opening the pigeon-hole afterwards, and read it; 
that he didn't ask anybody to look after the case in bankruptcy; 
that he found it when cleaning out the pigeon-holes in his desk and 
that he read it then, and that was the first time he knew what the 
paper meant; that when Hammond was in his office, he made out 
the paper in witness's presence; that Hammond asked the witness 
questions, and that he gave him information; that Hammond told 
him that he was trying to arrange affairs for some kind of a settle- 
ment; that witness asked him how they were going to arrange the 
affair; that Hammond told him they were going to try to compromise 
it; that he wanted to know if witness would be a party; that wit- 
ness said, yes, if he could find out what was going to be offered; 
that the paper was folded up through the middle and left on the 
corner of the desk; that it was folded cover out; that it was im- 
pressed upon his memory because he was going to Springfield for a 
few days, and that as soon as Mr. Hammond left he jumped and 
left everything; that he considered it merely a compromise basis; 
that he did not think he looked at the paper; that it was a pretty 
long desk; that witness was at one end and Hammond at the 
other; when Hammond went out witness followed him out; that 
witness did not think he looked at the paper. 

Joseph T. Hammond, an attorney-at-law, testified that he was 
an attorney practising in Pittsfield for twenty years or more; that 
he was counsel for Putnam through his attempts to compromise 
with creditors and through his bankruptcy; about the middle to the 
20th of April he went to see Raymond at his office, and 
did not find him in; in the middle of May he saw him; at that 
time Putnam had filed his petition in bankruptcy; he filed it on 
the nth of March; the first meeting of his creditors was on the 
29th of March; offer of compromise was made about the middle of 
June; after the offer of compromise he went to see Raymond and 
made out the paper annexed as * 'Exhibit A"; that he said to 
Raymond that Putnam had had a meeting of his creditors under 
the advice of Commissioner Smith, a meeting of the larger credi- 
tors; and they had appointed a committee, and that the committee 



j 2 LEGAL DICTATION 



were about to make their report; that he, witness, thought the 
estate would pay about twenty cents or twenty-five cents on a 
dollar; that he told Raymond that Putnam was in bankruptcy, and 
that he told him it was United States Commissioner Smith; that 
they were sitting in a rather small office; Raymond was on the 
right, sitting at his desk, and the witness on the left, both having 
equal portions of the desk; witness was sitting there and explained 
to Raymond the whole proceedings; told him that the first meeting 
had been held, the committee would report in a few days, and 
that he would see him again; after they had had the first meeting 
of the larger creditors, witness went again, soon after the 20th of 
June, ano said to Raymond the offer of twenty cents on a dollar, 
ten cents in cash and ten cents in notes at sixty days, had not been 
acceptable to the creditors; they would only accept twenty cents 
in cash, and that he had proceeded and had arranged for the twenty 
cents on a dollar, and that that had been deposited with the Clerk 
of the United States Bankruptcy Court; that he told Raymond that 
that had been accepted by a majority of the creditors in value and 
in number; that the first meeting or the meeting to act upon that 
was the nth of July; Raymond said, "I am going away for three 
or four days"; that this was the 28th day of June; that Raymond 
said he was going to be away and he would like to have the wit- 
ness come in and bring a proof on that day, a proof of claim in 
bankruptcy, and on the 7th day of July the witness took this 
blank proof, "Exhibit A," and that he told Raymond that the final 
meeting to act upon the discharge was upon the nth of July; that 
he brought in a blank proof and said that he could prove it for that; he 
could take it up to the United States Bankruptcy Court himself or 
he might take it to the witness's office; Raymond made no objec- 
tions; that witness wrote out on the blank, right in the presence of 
Raymond, asked him the firm name and wrote that in; then stand- 
ing up Raymond said, "I can't tell just the figures to put in there"; 
witness told him that would make no material difference, that he 
could write those in and bring that to the witness's office or he 
could take it right in to the United States Bankruptcy Court; Ray- 
mond said he would do so; the last words Raymond said to the 
witness on going out were, "Putnam will be in better condition 
to do business after he gets through this than he ever w r as before, 
won't he?" that the witness wrote the signature on therein his 



LEGAL DICTATION 73 



office and wrote the whole paper there; that he did not think the 
paper could be technically sworn to; that the witness said to Ray- 
mond this: "You swear that the amount which you will write in 
here will be the true and just account which the debtor is owing 
to you," and that Raymond said, "1 have not got the amount just 
now"; that Raymond did not say anything to the witness about 
affirming at that time; that witness said to Raymond on July 7 
something about the meeting of the creditors under the advice of 
the Commissioner; that the committee were appointed; that he was 
not there nearly so long on July 7 as he was on the 29th of June; 
that he said nothing at all about anything except Mr. Putnam's 
affairs at that time. 

This was all the testimony material to this bill of exceptions. 

At the close of the evidence the plaintiff asked the Court to 
rule that upon all the evidence he was entitled to recover; the 
Court declined so to rule, and found for the defendant The 
plaintiff, being aggrieved, duly excepted, and prays that his excep- 
tions may be allowed. 



By his attorney, 

Waldo S. Fitch. 



74 



LEGAL DICTATION 



COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 
Hampden, SS. Superior Court, Session Without Jury. 

April, 1900. 



Henry Hilton, 




Plaintiff, : 




-v.- 




Boston & Springfield Express Co., 




Defendant. 





Before 
Hon. Justice Perry 



Appearances: 

For the Plaintiff — Jones and Brown. 
For the Defendant — Walter E. Foster. 

The Plaintiff, being duly sworn, testified as follows: 



May 6, 1900. 



Q. What is your name? A. Henry Hilton. 
Q. Where do you live? A. City of Boston. 
Q. What is your business? A. Insurance solicitor or agent. 
Q. On November 1, 1896, where were you living, Mr. Hi! 

ton? A. City of Springfield. 



LEGAL DICTATION 75 



Q. How long had you been living there at that time? A. 
About one week. 

Q. What was your business there? A. The same, insurance 
solicitor. 

Q. Whether or not on that date you called at the defendant's 
office in Springfield? A. I did. 

Q. Could you describe it? A. I saw a large sign on the 
building which read, "Boston & Springfield Express Company," 
and then another which read, "Adams Express Company." I 
went into the office and asked t'hat gentleman there (indicating) if 
this was the office of the Boston & Springfield Express Company. 
He said it was. 1 asked him if he had an office in Boston. He 
said he had. I asked if he could take a trunk for me from my 
home in Boston to the city of Springfield and deliver it Friday. 
He said he didn't see why he couldn't deliver the next afternoon. 
I offered to pay him, but he said he couldn't accept no money, 
because they charged by weight. 

Q. Did you give him any order? A. I gave the order first 
verbally; he said, "Put it in writing." 1 said, "Let me have one 
of your order blanks," and he let me have one, and I filled it out 
and gave it to the gentleman. After 1 wrote the order he brought 
it over to the desk and placed the stamp upon it. 

Q. Is that your handwriting which is in that order? (show- 
ing to witness.) A. That is my handwriting, sir. 

Q. And the sticker that is on it, the stamp; who was that put 
on by? A. That gentleman there. 

Q. Who is this gentleman? A. The agent, 1 suppose, of the 
Boston & Springfield Express Company. 

Q. Is he the gentleman you saw there? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. And had your dealings with at that time? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. The man who said he was the agent of the Boston & 
Springfield Express Company? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Did you ever receive the trunk? A. No, sir. 

Q. Where did you get this order from afterwards? A. I 
sent for it. Mr. Wade had it. 

Q. Who is Mr. Wade? A. The gentleman I was rooming 
with at that time in the city of Springfield. 

Q. Is that the man who had charge of your trunk in Spring- 
field? A. Yes, sir. 



76 LEGAL DICTATION 



Q. And you wrote to him for this order? A. I did. I asked 
him if he had it, and if he did to sent it on immediately. 

Q. Have you ever since that time received this trunk? A. 
No, sir; never heard of it. 

Q. Have you a memorandum of the contents of the trunk? 
A. 1 have. 

Q. Well, what were the contents and the value of each article? 
A. One trunk, #6.50. 

Q. How long had you had the trunk? A. Three years. 

Q. What was the condition of it? A. Good condition. 

Q. Go on. A. One large strap; trunk strap that went 
around the trunk. 

Q. What was the value? A. Seventy-five cents. 

Q. You paid seventy-five cents for it? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. How long had you had it? A. About a year. 

Q. Go on. A. One gent's melton overcoat; twenty dol- 
lars. 

Q. You paid twenty dollars for it? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. How long had you had the overcoat? A. Bought it in 
November, and wore it off and on. 

Q. November before that? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. You had it one year then? A. 1 bought it in Novem- 
ber. 

Q. How long had you worn it during that year? A. Off 
and on until March; November, December, January, February, 
and March. 

Q. What was its condition at the time you lost it? A. It 
was in good condition. 

Q. Go on with the next article. A. One lady's beaver 
coat, fifteen dollars. 

Q. How long had you had that? A. About three months. 

Q. Whose property was it? A. My wife's. 

Q. Go on. A. Gent's worsted suit, fourteen dollars. 

Q. How long had you had that? A. Four months. 

Q. What was its condition? A. Good condition. 

Q. Next article? A. Lady's hat; four dollars; bought 
that in the month of January. 

Q. Value four dollars? A. Yes, sir; she paid for it. 

Q. You can go through this list. A. Gent's hat, worn 



LEGAL DICTATION 77 



about four months, collars, cuffs — of course I don't know; when I 
wore collars or cuffs out I would throw them away — two pairs 
cuffs; five pairs woolen stockings; two pairs underclothes; one 
large silk muffler; one pair slippers; one writing desk; two pairs kid 
gloves; gent's umbrella; one pair gold and silver indian clubs; one 
Webster's Dictionary, etc. 

Q. And the total value of these articles are how much? 
A. #100.30. 

Q. When did you go to the defendant's office to see if your 
trunk had arrived? A. I used to call every day. 

Q. When was the next time you called? A. The next 
afternoon. 

Q. And did you see anyone there? A. 1 did. 

Q. Whom? A. I saw this gentleman and another gentle- 
man. 

Q. And did he say anything about your trunk? A. He 
did not; at that time I asked if he had heard from it and he said 
he had not; and I would call occasionally, every other day prob- 
ably, after that, and at last I got tired of calling, and I asked him, 
Whom shall I correspond within regard to the loss of this trunk?" 
and he said, "Mr. Curtis of the city of Boston, of the Adams Ex- 
press Company." I asked him how that was, because I had 
given the order to the Boston & Springfield Express Company, and 
he said "The Adams Express and the Boston & Springfield Express 
Company are one." So I corresponded with Mr. Curtis. 

Q. Did you see Mr. Curtis at any time? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Where? A. In the office of the Boston & Springfield 
Express Company. 

Q. Where? A. In the city of Boston. 

Q. Did you have any conversation with him about the trunk? 
A. I did. 

Q. What was the nature of it? A. I asked him if he knew 
where the trunk was, and he said he didn't. I asked him if he 
received the order, and he said that the order was sent all right, 
but that it blew out of the cart — 
(This was objected to by Counsel for Defendant, as immaterial.) 

Q. This sticker on here, "Ship our matter by the Boston & 
Springfield Express Company," you say you saw this gentleman 

: LofC. 



yS LEGAL DICTATION 



here put it on? A. Yes, sir; I saw him stamp it on, and he 
came over after he stamped it on, and 1 could see it on the 
paper. 

CROSS-EXAMINATION OF HENRY HILTON. 

Q. Are you acquainted in Springfield? A. Not very much. 

Q. Before November i, '96? A. Not very much. 

Q. Had you been to the office of the Boston & Springfield 
Express Company before this date? A. No, sir. 

Q. But as you went in you noticed two signs over the door? 
A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Of the Boston & Springfield Express Company and the Adams 
Express Company? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. After you got inside the door, what did you do? A. I 
saw this gentleman at a desk — counter like. 

Q. And you asked him if that was the Boston & Springfield 
Express Company? A. Yes, sir; and he said it was. 

Q. And after he had answered your question you told him 
you wanted a trunk brought from Boston to Springfield? A. 
Yes, sir. 

Q. What mention was made of the Adams Company? A. 
Nothing at that time. 

Q. He gave you a piece of paper? A. I asked him to give 
me an order, after he told me to write an order; and I filled it out 
and gave it to him. 

Q. Then you turned around and walked away? A. I turned 
around and walked away. 

Q. You didn't see what he did with the order? A. Brought 
it over to the desk and stamped that stamp on it. I heard him 
thump the desk that way. (illustrating) 

Q. Did you go away after you gave the order? A. No, 
sir; not immediately. I might have stayed there five minutes. 
We conversed a little about the weather. 

Q. What did he do with the order? A. I saw him bring the 
order out to the desk, take the stamp out, and thump the desk. 

Q. What kind of a desk? A. The high desk. 

Q. As high as your head? A. No, I could see the top of it. 



LEGAL DICTATION 79 



Q. You could see the top of it; it slopes down in back? A. 
Yes, sir. 

Q. And you had your eyes especially on this piece of paper 
to see what he did with it? A, Not especially; 1 was looking 
towards him to see what he was doing. 

Q. And you saw him put this sticker on, did you? A. Yes, 
sir. 

Q. What did you see him do then? A. He brought the 
order over in front of me, read it and placed it in an envelope. 

Q. Did you see what kind of an envelope it was? A. I did 
not take notice. 

Q. Did you see what he did with the envelope? A. No, sir. 

Q. Then you did go away after you had seen him put it in 
an envelope and put the sticker on? A. Yes, sir; I offered to 
pay him. 

Q. What was your object, in staying after you gave him the 
order? A. I didn't expect to be in the house; and he told me he 
couldn't accept any money, because he must charge by weight. 

Q. I thought you had that conversation before you gave the 
order? A. Oh, no; 1 wrote out the order first. 

Q. Then the writing of the order was about the first thing you 
did here after you got there? A. After I asked him if this was 
the office ot the Boston & Springfield Express Co. 

Q. And the agent shoved this paper out to you right off? A. 
He went over to the desk and got it. 

Q. When did you make this inventory out? A. About the 
1 2th of December. I was requested to make out the inventory, 
and I made it out. 

Q. Did you have anything but your memory to go by? A. 
No, sir. 

Q. And these valuations opposite each article are the prices 
that they cost when they were new? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. You say that — take for instance the first, the trunk, $6.50 
— you say you had had that three years? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. How much was it worth then? A. It was worth as 
much to me then as it was when I bought it. 

Q. How much was it worth to go out in the market to sell it? 
A. I don't know, sir; I could not tell you; 1 know if I wanted to 
buy one like it I would probably have to pay the same price. 



80 LEGAL DICTATION 



Q. How much would you take for it at that time? A. Well, 
I wouldn't want to sell it, for I would have to pay the same price 
for one like it. 

(Counsel for Defendant) If your Honor can take judicial notice in 
regard to the depreciation of value of certain things after a lapse of 
time, it is unnecessary to go into these items. 

(The Court) I don't suppose I can take judicial notice, 
but I suppose I can apply my common sense. After it has been 
used three or four years it isn't new. 

Q. How many times had you used this trunk? A. I don't 
suppose that I have used it over a half a dozen or a dozen times in 
the three years. 

Q. How long trips? A. From Lawrence to Fitchburg and 
Fitchburg to Boston. 

Q. This gent's Melton overcoat, twenty dollars; that was the 
cost price? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. And you had it a year? A. Bought it in '97. 

Q. And you had worn it every day whenever you had occa- 
sion to wear one? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. This lady's beaver coat, you say now you had it only four 
months; didn't you say in the lower court three years? A. I 
don't think so; three or four months. 

Q. Hadn't you had the lady's coat three years? A. Oh. no; 
three months. 

Q. How about the coat? A. About three months. 

Q. Now it was a coat for winter wear? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Did you buy it in the middle of the summer? A. No, sir; 
the last of December or the first of January; that would make 
about ten months it had been in the trunk. 

Q. It was your wife's coat, was it? A- Yes, sir. 

Q. And she had worn it from January up until March? A. 
Yes, sir. 

Q. Worn it every day? A. When she would need it. 

Q. And the gent's worsted suit, fourteen dollars; how long 
had you had that? A. Four months. 

Q. Had you worn it every day? A. Occasionally on Sun- 
days. 

Q. Your best suit? A. Not exactly my best suit; I would wear 
it on Sundays, and weekdays sometimes. It was a worsted suit. 



LEGAL DICTATION 8 I 



Q. This gent's gold-headed umbrella, six dollars; how long had 
you had it? A. Three years, and then I had it re-covered. 
Q. How long had you had it re-covered? A. About a year. 
Q. Used it whenever it rained? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that your writing; your signature? A. Yes, sir, 
(Counsel for Defendant.) That is all. 

JENNIE E. WADE, being duly sworn on behalf of the Plain- 
tiff, testified as follows: 

Q. What is your name? A. Jennie E. Wade. 

Q. Where do you live, Mrs. Wade? A. Cambridge. 

Q. What street and number? A. 593 Broadway. 

Q. Where were you living in November, between November 1 
and November 5? A. The same address. 

Q. Are you the wife of B. S. Wade? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Did anyone at any time in November come to your house 
and deliver an order for a trunk? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. What date; do you remember? A. I think it was about 
the second day of November. 

Q. Is that the order? (showing to witness) A. Yes, sir; I 
should say it was. 

Q. Did you know the handwriting? A. Yes, sir; I saw Mr. 
Hilton's handwriting? 

Q. You knew it was Mr. Hilton's handwriting? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. At the time it was delivered was that sticker on it? That 
stamp? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Who was it that came with the order; do you remember? 
A. A young man; I should think he might be about twenty years 
old; smooth-faced; wore a dark brown suit. 

Q. What did he say? A. Said he represented the Boston 
& Springfield Express Company, and would like to have the trunk; 
said he would send his expressman for it. 

Q. What did you say? A. I said he couldn't have the 
trunk until Mr. Wade came home. Then Mr. Wade came home, 
and he sent Corey's Express with that order, and he gave the 
order to Mr. Wade, and he gave him the trunk. 

Q. When did he come first? A. About twelve o'clock. 



82 LEGAL DICTATION 



Q. When did he come again? A. About two-thirty. 

Q. And Mr. Wade at that time was in, was he? A. Yes, 
sir. 

Q. Did he leave the order with you when you gave him the 

trunk? A. No, sir; he didn't. 

Q. Who? The expressman? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. He gave it to Mr. Wade? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Do you know anything about the garments that were in 
the trunk? A. No, sir; I didn't see them. 

CROSS-EXAMINATION OF JENNIE WADE. 

Q. Did this gentleman that came first have on any uniform? 
A. No, sir. 

Q. No cap of any express company or anything of that sort? 
A. No, sir. 

Q. Plain citizen's clothes? A. Yes, sir. 

BENJAMIN S. WADE, being duly sworn on behalf of the 
Plaintiff, testified as follows: 

Q. What is your name? A. Benjamin S. Wade. 

Q. You live at 593 Broadway, Cambridge? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Mr. Wade, did Mr. Hilton live with you at any time? A. 
Yes, sir. 

Q. When? A. He came there I think it was — well, he 
came there in March, I think; about eight months altogether. 

Q. When he left did he leave anything at your house? A. 
Left his trunk. 

Q. Do you remember anyone calling for that trunk? A. 
Yes, sir. 

Q. What date was that? A. It was the second day of 
November. 

Q. Did the person present any written order for it? A. Yes, 
sir. 

Q. What kind of a looking man? A. Smooth-faced young 
man. I knew him; he drove for Corey's express over in Cam- 
bridge. 

Q. What did he say? A. He said he wanted the trunk; 



LEGAL DICTATION 83 



said a young man gave him the order. I said I wanted him to 
sign the order; he wanted to know what for. I said, for secur- 
ity, so that I would know who I was giving it to. So he signed 
the order and I gave him the trunk. 

Q. Is that his writing on there? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Was that sticker on it when you saw it? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. And he took this trunk away with him, this man from 
Corey's Express? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Did he leave this paper with you? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Did you see anything of the trunk after he took it away? 
A. No, sir; I did not 

Q. Did you know the handwriting on this order? A. Yes, 
sir; I did. 

Q. Whose? A. Mr. Hilton's. 

Q. Did you know anything ahout the articles in this trunk? 
A. Yes, sir; 1 have seen his clothes, because I used to go in his 
room. 

Q. Now this trunk — what was the condition of the trunk? 
A. Very good; first class. 

Q. Would you consider it was almost as good as new? A. 
I should; yes. It wasn't scratched or marked up any. It was in 
very good condition. 

Q. Was it a large trunk? A. A very large trunk. 

Q. Now this overcoat — had you seen it before Mr. Hilton put 
it away? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. What was its condition? A. Very good condition. 

Q. Did you see the lady's coat? A. No, I never noticed it. 

Q. This gent's suit — worsted? A. Yes, I have seen that. 

Q. What was its condition? A. In very good condition. 

Q. Did you know that it was Corey's Express Company's 
team that came for this trunk? A. Yes, sir; I looked at the 
name on the side of the team, because I wanted to know that the 
name on the side of the team was the same as signed there. 



PLAINTIFF RESTED 



84 LEGAL DICTATION 



CHARLES H. RICHARDSON, being duly sworn on behalf 
of the Defendant, testified as follows: 

Q. What is your name? A. Charles S. Richardson. 

Q. What is your residence? A. Springfield. 

Q. What is your business? A. Clerk in the express office; 
Boston & Springfield Express and the Adams. 

Q. Are the two companies now occupying the same office? 
A. They do. 

Q. And there is one desk in the office? A. One desk. 

Q. How tall a desk is it? A. I couldn't say. It would per- 
haps come up to here (indicating). It might be five feet. 

Q. Do you have a stool? A. Yes, sir; stool. 

Q. Do you remember Mr. Hilton coming into the office on 
November I? A. Yes, sir; if that is the date; I don't remember 
the date. 

Q. What was said? A. He came in and wanted to know if 
we could get a trunk for him from Boston, and I said yes, and 
I gave him an order which he filled out. and gave it back to me, 
and 1 put it in an Adams Express envelope and placed it on the 
desk. The conversation which he testified to is about the same as 
I remember. 

Q. Did he ask you if the Boston & Springfield Express Com- 
pany had an office in Boston? A. He did, and I told him 
that the Adams Express Company did, but the Boston & Spring- 
field did not. If I may explain that blank, I will say that I keep 
the stationery separate, but I got hold of the Boston and Spring- 
field paper; I presume I was out of the Adams Express Company 
paper. 

Q. But in the conduct of your business you ordinarily use 
whichever company's paper is to have charge of the matter? A. 
Yes, sir. 

Q. What did you do with it then? A. I folded it and put it 
in one of the Adams Express Company's envelopes, addressed to 
the Company's agent at Boston, Mass. 

Q. Did you put any sticker on? Did you stamp it? A. No, 
sir; I didn't do anything except to seal the envelope. 



LEGAL DICTATION 85 



Q. Connecting carriers have a custom of returning freight by 
the same route as they get their business in the first place? A. 
Yes, sir. 

Q. What is the route of the Boston & Springfield Express 
Company? A. Covers all the Old Colony system of the New 
York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad. 

Q. Does it cover Springfield? A. By way of Willimantic. 

Q. There is no direct line? A. We do not take Boston mat- 
ter from Springfield. 

Q. In order to get to Springfield it would start from New York 
on its regular line, and then come by way of Willimantic? A. 
Yes, sir. 

Q. Then what would be the route — what would be the cus- 
tomary route of this order? A. Springfield to Willimantic and 
Willimantic to Boston. 

Q. And from Boston to Charlestown by some local? A- Yes, 
sir. 

Q. Do all the employees of the Boston and Springfield Express 
Company have a distinctive uniform? A. They have a cap and 
a badge — metal badge pinned on the front of the cap, reading 
Boston & Springfield Express Company, with the figure of" a 
dog; the main body of the badge is red. Messengers and drivers 
wear those badges, not the clerks. 

CROSS EXAMINATION OF CHARLES H. RICHARDSON. 

Q. Did you read this order when it was given to you? A. 
I presume I did. 

Q. You saw that it was written, « 'Please give the Boston & 
Springfield Express Company my trunk"; you didn't ask him to 
alter it? A. No, sir. 

Q. You accepted it in that condition without offering any pro- 
test? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Now in regard to these stickers — you say you put it in an 
envelope of the Adams Express Company? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. What did you do with it then? A. I put it in what we 
call a messenger's bag that goes with the messenger on the train. 

Q. Put it in a messenger's bag? A. Yes, sir. 



86 LEGAL DICTATION 



Q. Then it was taken by the messenger to the train? A. 
Yes, sir. 

Q. If you were making this contract for the Adams Express 
Company, why didn't you tell him to make the order out to the 
Adams Express Company instead of the Boston & Springfield 
Express Company? A. I didn't tell him anything. I gave him 
a piece of paper and he wrote it. 

Q. And you accepted it in the way it was written? A. Yes, 
sir. 

Q. And you act as agent for both companies? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. What is the purpose of this stamp? A. To have the 
goods returned by the companies that are indicated there. 

Q. And that is why the agents and employees of this corpora- 
tion put this stamp on orders? A. Yes, sir. 

(This was objected to by Counsel for Defendant) 

Q. Where could that stamp be put on except by the officers 
in your company? A. By the messengers on the route to Boston. 

Q. The messengers that are employed by your company? A. 
Yes, sir; they carry them on the cars. 

Q. Where else might it be done? A. It might be done in 
Boston. 

Q- In one of the offices of your company? A. Possibly; if it 
gets into an office. 

Q. These stickers are not scattered round broadcast through 
the world? A. Yes, they are; they are scattered through the em- 
ployees of this company. 

Q. But not through employees of other companies? A. They 
might apply to some other company. 

Q. Mr. Hilton called at the office sometime and gave you a 
copy of this order, after the trunk was lost? A. Yes; he did. 

Q. Did you put a stamp on it? A. I don't know; I won't 
swear as to that. I know a copy was made for Mr. Curtis. I 
think possibly 1 did when Mr. Curtis was there. 

Q. How many orders did you take that day? A. I could not 
tell you sir. I have no idea whether it was one or ten. 

Q. And you are agent for this Boston & Springfield Express 
Company as well as the other companies; and the Boston & 
Springfield Express Company are common carriers of goods, are 



LEGAL DICTATION 87 



they — trunks and all kinds or merchandise? A. I presume they 
are; yes. 

Q. And you remember Mr. Hilton's calling and asking you 
when he called, if that was the office of the Boston & Springfield 
Express Company? A. Yes, sir. 

Q. And if there was an office in Boston? A. I told him that 
there was an office of the Adams Express there. 

Q. Are you sure that you didn't tell him that the Boston 
& Springfield had an office there? A. Very positive, sir; because 
I had no object in telling him that. 

Q. Was there anyone in the office then? A. I could not 
say. 

Q. Were you busy that day? A. Busy most of the time. 

Q. A great many people come in and out during the day? A. 
Oh, we have a few during the day. 

Q. All kinds of questions are fired at you — have you got a 
distinct remembrance of the conversation with Mr. Hilton? A. 
Pretty sure; not sure of every word; he came in so many times 
inquiring about it we got to be old acquaintances. 

REDIRECT EXAMINATION OF CHARLES H. RICHARDSON. 

Q. Do local companies have these stickers, Mr. Richardson. 
A. Oh, yes; all express companies do. 

Q. Who is Mr. Curtis? A. He is Superintendent of the 
Adams Express Company. 

Q. Do you know whether or not the Boston & Springfield 
Express Company and the Adams Express Company are one and 
the same corporations, or two distinct corporations? A. Two dis- 
tinct corporations. All accounts are kept separate. 

(Counsel for Defendant) I want to put in this letter. 
(Counsel for Plaintiff) I object. I think it ought to have 
been offered when Mr. Hilton was on the stand, so that I could 
ask him about it. 

(Counsel for Defendant) I don't object to your inquiring of 
him about it. 

(Counsel for Plaintiff) All right, then; put it in. 
(Counsel for Defendant read the letter from Mr. Hilton to 
Mr. Curtis.) 

DEFENDANT RESTED. 



LEGAL DICTATION 



HUGH HILTON, the Plaintiff, being recalled, testified as 
follows. 

Q. (Counsel for Plaintiff) What induced you to write to Mr. 
Curtis as Superintendent of both companies, when he said that the 
Boston & Springfield and Adams Express Company are one. I 
corresponded with Mr. Curtis, and that is why I wrote the letter 
to him. I wrote several letters to him. 

Q. (Counsel for Defendant) Aren't you stretching that a little 
when you said this? A. I asked the question, who 1 should 
correspond with. He said, "Mr. Curtis, the Superintendent." 
I asked him how was that; I sent the order by the Boston & 
Springfield Express Company; and he said that the Boston & 
Springfield and the Adams Express Company were the same com- 
pany. 

EVIDENCE CLOSED. 

(The Court gave permission to the Counsel for Plaintiff to 
amend the declaration.) 



LEGAL DICTATION 89 



CHARGE TO THE JURY. 
Mr. Foreman and Gentlemen-. 

The consideration given by the Court to the questions in this 
case will simplify the presentation of the case to you, so that 
although there are questions in the case which have been the 
occasion of some consideration upon the part of the Court as to 
what should be presented to you, yet the questions which you 
will have to determine in the case are simple, and 1 hope they will 
be plain to your minds. 

This is a contract of insurance by an association called a 
fraternal beneficiary association with an individual, a person who 
is a member of the association. This association is doubtless 
organized for social purposes largely and perhaps mainly, and a 
great many of its members are not insured, as I understand. 
Many of its members are members simply for the purposes of social 
intercourse with their other associates and fellows, and there is no 
question of pecuniary benefit for death or insurance in their cases; 
but there is a rank or department or branch which secures insur- 
ance to those who are in that rank and who have conformed to the 
requirements preliminary to the obtaining of that insurance. 

Now the question here simply is whether the requirement 
which was necessary in order to obtain this insurance existed, and 
whether you find that the necessary requirements existed here in 
order that the plaintiff should recover. 

The plaintiff is the administrator of the estate of Henry H. 
Wise. 

This insurance was for the benefit of Mrs. Wise, the wife of 
the deceased, the insured. She died before he did; but if the 
insurance is valid and binding it may be recovered by the adminis- 
trator of the deceased for the benefit of those who succeed to the 
right to the money. Now the question is whether the insurance 
was valid or binding. All insurance generally is contingent upon 
something. A person is insured against injury or from loss by 
fire or loss by accident, or so that upon his death there accrues to 
those who are called beneficiaries, somtimes his own heirs merely, 
sometimes individuals, the right to the recovery of a certain sum of 



90 LEGAL DICTATION 



money. Any class ot insurance is based upon some requirements, 
some conditions. To illustrate what I mean, there can be no such thing 
as fire insurance of a building or a house which is in such condition 
that fire will inevitably occur or is likely to occur, or under such 
conditions as will leave the insured at liberty to destroy his own 
house or building by fire. I put that extreme case by way of 
illustration. 

Take the question of life insurance or the insuring of a person's 
life. It is always based upon certain conditions as to health, 
always based upon certain examinations of physicians, always 
based upon certain representations made by the insured to 
the company. Now in this case the questions that you will con- 
sider relate to two answers in this application. This paper which 
I have in my hand is the application of Henry H. Wise. 
Upon the strength of the application the certificate of insurance 
was issued. The application contains a large number of questions, 
and a large number of answers, most of which you need not con- 
sider, most of which are not in question, and the contention here 
on the part of the defendant is in relation to two questions prin- 
cipally; First: "Have you ever had or have you now any other 
disease or infirmity than those above mentioned?" Second: 
"Have you ever met with any accident or personal injury or under- 
gone any surgical operation?" Both of these questions were ans- 
wered No by Mr. Wise. 

Now I rule to you as a matter of law that whether you 
should find for the plaintiff or not in this case depends upon the 
truthfulness or correctness of those answers. If you find that 
those answers were untrue, the plaintiff cannot recover. If you 
find that those answers were true, the plaintiff may recover. 

Now take the first question: "Have you ever had or have 
you now any other disease or infirmity than above mentioned ? ' ' The 
"above mentioned" diseases or infirmities are contained in a list 
which you will have with you. They begin with A and go down 
alphabetically through a considerable list of diseases and troubles 
which afflict the human frame. There is then this: Have you had 
any disease?" He says No. Had he? Neuralgia is not mentioned 
in that list. "Have you had other than those mentioned in that 
list?" He has answered that he didn't have those diseases, and 



LEGAL DICTATION 9 1 



then the succeeding question is, "Have you ever had any disease 
or infirmity other than above mentioned?" The defendant says 
he did, that he had obstinate neuralgia, and that was a disease. 
Now that is the question which you are find on. There has been 
testimony upon that question here. Medical men have been on 
the stand. Physicians have testified, and you will take careful 
consideration of their testimony and what they have said, and give 
it such weight as you think you should. The members of the 
family have been upon the stand, some of them, and they have 
testified with reference to Mr. Wise's condition and state of 
health. 

Now, you are not to decide this case by some other case. You 
are not to reason in a way which will carry you to an absurd 
extreme in either direction. Because you would not call a trifling 
ailment a disease, it does not follow that you should not call 
neuralgia a disease. 

On the other hand, if you are forced to say, if you must say, 
that a serious case of disease, whatever may be the character of it 
and whatever may be the nature of it, is something different from 
neuralgia, it does not follow from that necessarily that neuralgia is 
a disease; but is neuralgia a disease? and is neuralgia such as Mr! 
Wise had a disease? Perhaps you would not say if a man had 
neuralgia — and I am putting this by way of illustration — rhat if a 
man had neuralgia for a day and never had it again and never had 
it before, perhaps you would not say that that was a disease. 
Perhaps you would say that if he had severe and obstinate neural- 
gia continually and for a considerable period of time, that was a 
disease. Now I am putting two extremes. The evidence in this 
case you have before you. I have no right to comment upon it 
except to call your attention to it; no right to comment upon it in 
such a way as to indicate an opinion; only the right to comment 
upon it in such a way as to call it to your attention and present 
the facts to you so that you can better deal with them. Was this 
neuralgia as he had it a disease? 

Well, if he had neuralgia, and if it was a disease, before the 
month of May, 1886, when he was insured, that vitiates the 
insurance, because he said he didn't have a disease. 

Now, I ought, perhaps, to call your attention to another phase 



92 LEGAL DICTATION 



of this matter, and I can do it best, I think, by stating very briefly 
this: That in the view which I take of the law the tendency of a 
disease, if he had a disease, to shorten life or affect the risk is not 
involved in this question and has nothing to do with this issue. 
There are certain statutes in the Commonwealth which might in- 
volve that question. I do not think they relate to this class of 
insurance. The question here is whether those questions which 
were answered were answered truly or not, and as to this ques- 
tion which I have been discussing, "Have you ever had or have 
you now any other disease or infirmity than those diseases above 
mentioned?" the question is whether he had ever had a disease. 
What a disease is is for you to say. You are to say it intelligently 
upon the testimony given you here, upon the intelligent considera- 
tion of the testimony of the physicians, and of the members of the 
family, as to his condition. You are to say whether he ever had 
a disease, and whether this condition of neuralgia which was upon 
him was a disease. 

If you find that it was, it vitiates the policy. If you find that 
was not, and he answered truly, it does not vitiate the policy. 

Now I say the same to you with reference to the other ques- 
tion. Have you ever undergone any surgical operation?" He 
says No. He says he had never undergone any surgical operation. 
The defendant says that several years before he had under- 
gone the surgical operation of having his jaw perforated and hav- 
ing the ends of the nerve or nerves going down through the face 
here (indicating) and communicating with the mouth and teeth, 
exposed and cut off by a physician, by a surgeon; and the de- 
fendant says, "What is that but a surgical operation?" That is the 
claim of the defendant here. If that was a surgical operation 
which had taken place before 1886, it vitiates the policy, because he 
answered that there was no surgical operation which had been 
performed upon him. 

But the plaintiff says that is not a surgical operation; that is 
no more than might occur from an operation upon the teeth. 
Neuralgia in the face is but an aggravation of a serious disturbance 
of the teeth, and it does not come to the character of a surgical 
operation. Well, gentlemen, was it a surgical operation or was it not? 
Do not minimize, do not magnify, do neither, go to neither extreme. 



LEGAL DICTATION g^ 



The physicians have testified to you as to what took place and 
there is their evidence. You are not to exaggerate, you are not to 
diminish the character of this which was done to his face. You 
are to use your common sense, your judgment. When we speak 
of a surgical operation, what do we mean? You have about as 
good an comprehension of what is meant by a surgical operation as 
you would have after any definition which I might give you. You 
speak of some friend having had some surgical operation, or you 
might say such a man had trouble, and speak of something which 
was done to him which you would not think was a surgical opera- 
tion. Now, to bore through the jaw or to make an incision 
through the jaw, pick up the ends of a nerve and cut off the ends 
of the nerve by a physician or surgeon who acts with a knife upon 
a human body, what is that? Is that a surgical operation? That 
is for the jury to say. The court must not say. 

In order that there may be no doubt about this, when you 
bring in your verdict, I have written two questions here which you 
will answer over the signature of the foreman. Ordinarily you 
would return a verdict and nothing more, but in this case — for the 
sake of explicitness — it is better that you answer these questions. - 
The first is: "Had Henry H. Wise, the insured, any other 
disease than those mentioned in the application at the time of the 
application or prior thereto ?" Second: "Had he prior to that 
time undergone any surgical operation?'' 

Now, gentlemen, as you answer those questions so you will 
return your verdict. If you answer both of them No, you will be 
at liberty to return for the plaintiff. If you return a verdict for the 
plaintiff, you will return a verdict for the sum of three thousand dollars 
with interest upon it from the date of the writ. You will have the 
writ with you and can reckon interest at six per cent, from the date 
of the writ. But if you answer those questions, or either or them, 
Yes, if you say that he did have a disease prior to that time other 
than those mentioned in the application, or that he did undergo 
prior to that time a surgical operation, then you will return a ver- 
dict for the defendant. If you answer either of the questions in 
the affirmative, the verdict will be for the defendant. If you 
you answer both of those in the negative, your verdict will be for 



94 LEGAL DICTATION 



the plaintiff, and you will return a verdict, of course, in addition 
to the answer. 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT. We take exception as to the 
first request for ruling, and upon the whole evidence. 

COUNSEL for Plaintiff. In addition to the requests for 
ruling, I would like an exception to that part, "I rule to you as a 
matter of law." 

THE COURT. With reference to the statutes? 

Counsel for Plaintiff. Yes, sir; and also the note that 
you made there with reference to the exclusion of the matter of 
that part of the contract bearing upon the question of reasonable 
belief and upon the matter of the expectancy of life. 



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